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I. STATEMENT OF THE C^SE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below
The underlying case is a sheriffs sale/redemption dispute. Appellants J. Bond and

Dorius are former attorneys for Appellee David Pyper (;TyJ3ef') and obtained a judgment
against Pyper for unpaid legal fees. J. Bond and Dorius (hereinafter, ''the Attorneys*')
instituted a sheriffs sale of Pyper's real property. Upon completion of the sale, they
transferred some of their interest in the real property to Appellant A. Bond (also an
attorney). Pyper disputed the sale based on, among other things, gross inadequacy of the
purchase price and irregularities by the Attorneys during th^ six-month redemption
period.
This case was tried at a day-long hearing before Sixth District Court Judge David
Mower on June 23, 2008. In his September 2. 2008 Memorandum Decision (Including
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Judge Mower se(t aside the sheriffs sale. He
signed and entered the final order in this case on October l|5, 2008. The Attorneys
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Trial Court's decision in
Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331. The Attorneys now appfeal the Pyper decision.
B.

Pyper's Response to the Attorneys' Statement offyte Facts
The Attorneys inappropriately attempt to set forth a [number of factual allegations

in the Statement of Facts and Argument sections of their Btief of Appellants Their
factual allegations are irrelevant and inapplicable because The Attorneys asserted no
challenge before the Pyper court of the Trial Court's findings of fact (and, indeed, they
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failed to marshal any evidence before the Pyper court that supported the Trial Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law). Accordingly, the Trial Court's findings of fact
(set forth immediately below) govern over any facts asserted by the Attorneys.
C.

Pyper's Statement of Material Facts
Because the Trial Court's findings of fact govern this appeal, Pyper restates the

Trial Court's salient findings of fact from the Memorandum Decision:
1.

Pyper incurred attorney's fees to J. Bond in the amount of $9,064.82,
which Pyper failed to pay. (R. at 406, UK 3-4)

2.

J. Bond filed an action to collect his attorney's fees, resulting in a March
1, 2006 judgment of $10,577.23 against Pyper. (R. at 407, H1J5-6)

3.

J. Bond then obtained a Writ of Execution to collect on the judgment,
and levied against real property owned by Pyper. (R. at 407, Iff7-8)

4.

Pyper's real property is a 1,500 - 1,600 square foot house on a one-half
acre lot valued in the range of $125,000 to $127,764. (R. at 407,119)

5.

A sheriffs sale occurred on November 9, 2006 whereat J. Bond was the
only bidder. (R. at 407,11^10-12)

6.

J. Bond successfully bid $329, which was the only bid on the property.
(R. at 407-408, HH13-16)

7.

J. Bond did not pay any cash for the property because the sale price of
$329 was less than the $10,577.23 judgment. (R. at 408,1117)

8.

At the time there were several liens on the property, which Pyper w^as

able to clear off in April 2007. (R. at 408, |H 19)
9.

Even assuming there was still a $50,000 miortgage on the property, based
on the $125,000 - $127,764 value of the property, there was $75,000 $77,764 equity in the property, which J. Bpnd bought for $329. (R. at
413)

10.

Pyper desired to redeem the property fromlthe Sheriffs sale. (R. at 408,
1120)

11.

On April 20, 2007, Pyper called the Attorneys' law firm (Dorius, Bond,
Reyes & Linares) asking for a judgment lijsn payoff (R. at 408,1121)

12.

Pyper was unable to speak with either oftitleAttorneys, but was told by
their staff that the firm would call him bac^k. (R. at 408,1122)

13.

No one called Pyper back. However, on April 25, 2007 Pyper made
another phone call to the law firm and spo|ke with Dorius about a payoff
amount. (R. at 408, H23)

14.

Although Dorius and Pyper have conflicting accounts of the April 25,
2007 conversation, Dorius told Pyper he Reeded to first talk to J. Bond
about it. (R. at 408-409, H1J24-25)

15.

Thereafter, Pyper called Dorius's office e^ery day, making a total of
approximately 28 phone calls. (R. at 409 1126)

16.

Pyper explained that he called the law firrh these many times in order to
obtain a payoff amount because he did no^: know the exact amount, and
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thought that some interest might have been added to the original amount.
(R. at 411,1144)
17.

On May 16, 2007, a Sheriffs Deed w as issued transferring the property
to Bond. (R. at 409,1127)

18.

On May 17, 2007, Pyper called J. Bond and told him that Pyper had
money to pay off the judgment. (R. at 409,1^28-29)

19.

J. Bond told Pyper that the Attorneys needed to get together and figure
out the amount of the payoff, and that he would call Pyper back. (R. at
410, U130-32)

20.

J. Bond never called Pyper back. (R. at 410, H33)

21.

Pyper kept calling the Attorneys almost every day until May 30, 2007.
(R. at 410, H36)

22.

On May 30, 2007, Pyper called his attorney, Bryan Quesenberry, for
help in obtaining the payoff amount. (R. at 410,113 7)

23.

That same day Quesenberry called Dorius to ask for a payoff amount.
(R. at 410,1138)

24.

Dorius told Quesenberry that Dorius would call him back by end of the
week, but never called Quesenberry back. (R. at 411, H1J39-40)

4

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Attorneys5 first argument seeking reversal of th4 Court of Appeals decision in
Pyperv, Bond, 2009 UT App 331 is that the Pyper court incorrectly applied Utah caselaw
when it interpreted the two-part test established in Young v[ Schroeder, 37 P. 252 (1894)1
and reaffirmed in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 19$4). This argument, however,
misreads the Young decision, ignores the United States Supreme Court's affirmation of
Young, and also misreads the Pyper court's review and application of Young,
The Attorneys' second argument on appeal is that P|yper supposedly creates
unwise precedent. This argument, however, is premised on| a convenient and selective
ignorance of facts found by the Trial Court in favor of Pyp^r. Viewing Pyper in light of
the compelling facts which the Trial Court and the Pyper court found shocking, both
courts properly invoked their equitable discretion to extend] the redemption period in
favor of Pyper.

1

A copy of Young is attached hereto as Appendix exhibit ijiumber 1.
5

III. ARGUMENT
The correct standard of review is abuse of discretion according to Huston v.
Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991). Huston is one of the three key cases related to this
appeal, and is discussed below. In Huston, the court held that expanding the redemption
period is discretionary:
We have stated that in appropriate circumstances, a court may enlarge a
redemption period under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(2). Rule 6(2) provides.
'When by these rules . . . an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specific time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order
the period enlarged . . . . v Since rule 6(2) clearly grants the court discretion, we
review the court's decision for an abuse of that discretion, [footnote omitted].
Generally, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless, given the applicable law
andfacts, the Mai court's decision is unreasonable, [footnote omitted]
Id. at 534 (emphasis added). See also, State in Interest of H., 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah
1980) (citation omitted) (holding, uIn equity proceedings we are charged with the
responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and it is the established rule that we will not
disturb the findings and determination made unless they are clearly against the weight of
the evidence, or the court has abused its discretion^).
Summarizing this burden of proof on appeal, the Huston court explained that in
order for the Attorneys "to succeed, they must show that the equities of the[] case are not
so compelling that the trial judge acted unreasonably in . . . extending the period/'
Huston, 818 P.2d at 536.
A.

THE PYPER COURT PROPERLY APPLIED YOUNG, PENDER AND
OTHER RELEVANT CASELAW
Abandoning in their Brief of Appellants the certiorari argument that the Pvper

6

court erred in interpreted Young's two-part test in setting astide a sheriffs sale, the
Attorneys focus their efforts on distinguishing Young and Render from the present
dispute by arguing that the Pyper court failed to properly aflply these cases.
As set forth in Pyper, the test to be applied in the prdsent case to equitably extend
the redemption period is (1) whether there was such a gros^ inadequacy of price in the
Attorneys' purchase of the Pyper Property that would shocljc the conscience, and (2)
whether there were irregularities attending the sale (or redemption period). Pyper, 2009
UT App 331, «[[ 1 1 (citing Young, 37 P. at 254). Notably, th|e Attorneys did not attack the
first part of this two-part test in their appeal to the Pyper cdurt. (See, Brief of Appellants,
Utah Court of Appeals, pgs. 10-17). Now, before the present Court, the Attorneys do not
attack the Pyper court's recitation of this two-part test deriyed from Young. Instead, they
Attorneys complain that the Pyper court misapplied certain] conclusions or principals that
the Pyper court derived from Young.
1.

The Trial Court and Pyper Court Property Concluded that the Facts of
This Case Satisfy the First Part of the Young Test

To the extent the Attorneys argue the first part of th£ Young test (i.e. by claiming
that there was no gross inadequacy of price), they are barred because of their failure to
assert this argument in their underlying appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. (See, Brief
of Appellants at 10-17). Nor do the Attorneys actually address this first prong of the
Young test in their Brief of Appellants in the present appeapL The Attorneys have thus
implicitly conceded the first part of Young's two-part test. However, in case the
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Attorneys attempt to resurrect this argument in their reply appeal brief, Pyper addresses it
as follows.
Regarding the first part of the Young test (i.e. gross inadequacy of price), both the
Trial Court and the Pyper court were appalled at the sacrifice of Pyper's property (which
was conservatively valued at containing $75,000 in equity). Both courts found that when
comparing the $75,000 windfall the Attorneys received for the paltry sheriffs sale price
of $329, such clearly shocked the conscience of an impartial mind and was a grossly
inequitable sacrifice of Pyper's property (and after the sheriffs sale the Attorneys still
had their $10,577.23 judgment against Pyper!)J. The Attorneys' $329 sheriffs sale
purchase price was 0.44% of the $75,000 value of Pyper's property. By comparison, the
creditor in Young obtained a $1,673.36 default judgment against the debtor, and then
executed on the debtor's real property, which was valued at $25,000. Young, 37 P. at
252. The Young sheriff sale purchase price translates into 6.7% of the value of the
debtor's property. In reviewing these facts, the Young court held:
wherever the court perceives that a sale of property has been made at a grossly
inadequate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a
strong, and, in general, a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct proof
of fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the ignorance, -weakness, or
the disfress or necessity of the vendor, and this imposes on the purchaser a
2

This $75,000 value would have been the value at the time of the sheriffs sale, but six
months later when the sheriffs deed was issued, the value of Pyper's property was
$125,000 because Pyper had removed, among other things, a $50,000 bank lien.
3

It is critical to note that the Trial Court never dissolved the Attorneys' judgment or their
judgment lien on Pyper's property. The Attorneys still maintain their judgment and their
ability to re-schedule a new sheriffs sale if the Pyper decision is affirmed.
8

necessity to remove this violent presumption by the plearest evidence of fairness
of his conduct.
Id. at 254 (emphasis added). Whether viewing the 0.44% pjurchase-to-value in the
present case b\ MsclL or whdhct" ucwing if juxtaposed to the 6.7% purchase-io-valnr of
Young, the Attorneys in the present case clearly obtained Pyper" s property for a song. It
is thus no wonder the Trial Court and the Pyper court foun4 the sheriff sale purchase
price in the present case constituted a gross inadequacy of jj)rice that shocked the
conscience of a reasonable person, wh ich is the first par 1: of the Young test.
The Pyper court even noted, correctly, that this conclusion (regarding the first
prong of the Young test) could alone form the basis (without further considering the
second prong of the Y oung test) for equitably extending the redemption period P\ per,
2009 I JT App 331, fl.2 n 5 (citing Young. 37 P. at 254 ("If the inadequacy is so gross as
at once to shock the conscience of all fair and impartial mhads, if the sacrifice is such that
even7 honest man would hesitate to take advantage of it it may well be doubted whether
every such case would be beyond the power of a c • :>i: n t of eqi lity to relieve a gainst")).
2.

The Trial Court and Pyper Court Properly Concluded that the Facts of
This Case Satisfy the Second Part of the Yjpung Test

In the context of the second part of the Young test (Regularities attending the
sale, or slight ci rci lmstances when the pi irehaser is an attorney)5 the A ttorneys spend
considerable time in their Brief of Appellants arguing that the Pyper court misapplied the
facts of Young. The Attorneys are in error. The Pyper coiirt correctly affirmed the Trial
Court's conclusion ilia t the.,./ \ ttorne> s? c -onduct diiri ng the six-mc >nth redemption period.
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and the fact that the Attorneys are lawyers, amounted to slight circumstances attending
the sale, and thus allowed Pyper to satisfy the second part of Young's two-part test.
-(a)v

In Both Young and Pyper, Lawyers that Participated in the
Sheriffs Sales Were the Same Lawyers that Purchased the
Debtors5 Property Sold at the Sheriffs Sales

In Young the creditor's lawyers, who attached and levied on the debtor's property,
were the same lawyers who purchased the debtor's property at the sheriffs sale. Young,
27 P. at 255. The same occurred in the sheriffs sale at issue in the present appeal. The
Attorneys scheduled the sheriffs sale, caused it to be published, and one of them
attended and, being the only bidder, successfully credit-bid a fraction ($329) of the total
$10,577.23 judgment against Pyper to obtain Pyper's property at the sheriffs sale. (See,
Pyper's Statement o Material Facts, supra, ^ 3 , 5-6).
The Young court explained that because the creditors' attorneys participated in
and purchased the debtor's property from the sheriffs sale, their conduct required special
scrutiny. Id. at 254 ("an additional feature of the transaction is that Stephens &
Schroeder were members of the bar, attorneys for the judgment creditors, who thus, under
the forms of law and the processes of the court, sought to enrich themselves without any
consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor . . ."). The Young court viewed the
creditors' participation in the purchase of the debtor's property at the sheriffs sale with
stern disapproval:
A purchase by an attorney for his own benefit at a sale over which he has
exercised any direction or control should always be closely scrutinized by the
court. [Citation omitted]. 'Public policy and the analogies of the law require that

10

they should be considered per se as in the twilight between legal fraud and
fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon slight
additional facts * [Citation omitted]
A

id. ;.. .Jf-jo u'iMpiiciM^ L-iL!-.ic:j). :\: achroeder v. Yuting, 161 U.S. 334, (] 896), ' the
siibseqiient United States Supreme Court decision that affiijmed Young, the United States
Supreme Court specifically addressed this attorney-as-purcjiaser situation:
Although there is no general rule that an attorney m^y not purchase at an
execution sale, provided it be not done to the prejudice of his own clients, [citation
omitted] such purchase in itself is calculated to thrdw a doubt upon the fairness of
the sale, and as is quaintly said of such sales by the \Court ofAppeals of Kentucky
in Howell v. McCreeiy, 7 Dana, 388: Tublic policy and the analogies of law
require that they should be considered per se as in the twilight between legal fraud
and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon
slight additional facts " [Citations omitted]
Id. a I: 340 (emphasis added). I he P> per court: followed Young in acknowledging this
exact same attorney-as-purchaser situation existed in the present dispute, and thus
justified requiring only slight irregularities. Pyper, 2009 UfT App 331, ^ 1 2 . 1 fi-17. ?0,
In so holding, JAC r\per cour t clear 1}- and correctl) followed Utah and United States
Supreme Court precedent.
(b)«

fii Both Young and Pyper, Lawyers'Who Participated in the
Sheriffs Sales and then Purchased the Creditors' Properties
Misled the Creditors During the Subsequent Six-Month
Redemption Period

Another striking similarity between Young and Pypfer again involves the lawyers
participating in the sheriffs sales. In Young, lawyers for the creditors misled and made
misrepresentations to Liic debtors after the actual sheriff sales (there were three) by telling
4

A copy of Schroeder is attached in the Appendix as exhibit number 2.
11

the creditor they would not enforce the six-month statutory redemption period:
after said several sales had been made, and before the time for redemption had
expired, [attorney] Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory time for
redemption would not be insisted upon . . .
Young, 37 P. at 253. Relying thereon, the debtor in Young allowed the redemption
period to expire. Id.
In the present case Pyper called the Attorneys (J. Bond and Dorius - J. Bond set
up the sheriffs sale and was the buyer at the sheriffs sale; Dorius was his law partner at
the time) approximately 28 times by phone during the redemption period, asking for a
payoff on the judgment. Rather than scorn Pyper, tell him to stop calling, tell him to find
his own attorney, or tell him no such payoff would be forthcoming, the Attorneys instead
strung Pyper along by telling him they would call him back with a payoff number. Pyper
relied on their promises, and the knowledge that they were attorneys bound by ethical
obligations,5 and so waited for their return call. He did not receive the return call, and so
peppered then: law office with many phone calls.
5

The Pyper court noted, "As Pyper's former counsel, [the Attorneys] had some
obligation not to take advantage of Pyper* s known ignorance." Pyper, 2009 UT App 331
at1fl7 (footnote omitted) (citing Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107.
Tfl|52-53 (discussing continuing nature of attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty
after termination of attorney-client relationship)); see also, Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct 4.3(a) ("When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding/*); Rule 14-301 of the Standards
of Professionalism and Civility, Preamble ("Lawyers should exhibit courtesy, candor and
cooperation in dealing with the public and participating in the legal system/'): Rule 14301(6) of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility ("Lawyers shall adhere to their
express promises and agreements, oral or written, and to all commitments reasonably
implied by the circumstances or by local custom/5)
12

Pyper s experience with the Attorneys' poor communications and unfulfilled
promises was not his alone, His attorney had the same phoifLe call with Dorius. received
the same promise of a i eturn call wi th a payoff amoi int. and received the same response
accorded to Pyper - no return call. As a result, the Attorneys' misrepresentations caused
Pyper to wait just long enough for the six-month redemption period to expire. Both the
\ 11--: CoLiri and i-'\ per court found that these facts amounted to circumstances sufficient
to satisfy the M.', ".J part of the Young test.
In sum, the present case tracks along Young in three)critical areas: (1) the present
case, even more than Young, consisted of an appalling sacrjfice of the debtor's property
wiuw.. i> exiacii, ^ii^;; cumpcinuLi uic \. !,. v\\':^ • ''•••• **- property sold at the sheriff *"s
s;dr u. • * v r-rkv *\iid for said nrr^cn\. 12 :• lawyers were heavily involved in the conduct
of the sheriffs sales and subsequent redemption period, and in fact, purchased the
debtor's property at said sales, and (.• / u;^ id\v\ er> in\ o\\ iu in me purcna^e oi Uie
debtor's property at said sales subsequently mislead the debtor di iri rig the six-month
redemption period such that said period expired to the detriment of the debtor.6

6

Interestingly, in discussing Young in detail the court in Hjuston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531.
535-6 (Utah 1991) cited these three key facts in reaffirming Young:
[1] Land worth $26,000 was sold to satisfy a judgment of $1,700, [2] the
purchasers were the attorneys for the judgment debtor. [3] the purchasers directed
the land to be sold in parcels in a manner that prevented the land from being sold
at a fair price, and [4] the purchasers assured the debtor that they would not insist
on the statutory period for redemption.
Id. at 536 (citing Young, 37 P. at 254-56).
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3.

The Attorneys' Criticism of the Pyper Court's Reliance on Pender is
Misplaced

In their Brief of Appellants, the Attorneys take umbrage with the Pyper court's
reliance on Pender (see, Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 at ^15). arguing that, "In Pender, the
debtor was deliberately misled by the purchaser/' (See, Brief of Appellant at 13). The
Attorneys further complain about the two additional factors cited in ^15 of the Pyper
decision, stating, "Both of these [factors] in Pender are again affirmative actions by the
purchaser that directly influenced the sale and impeded the redemption process." Id. The
Attorneys misapprehend the Pyper court's reliance on Pender.
The Pyper court relied on Pender to support the conclusion that the "irregularities
attending the sale" include any irregularities that occur during the redemption period. In
fact, such redemption-period irregularities occurred in Pender when the creditor and his
attorney exhibited "studious silence" about their intent to collect the judgment despite
repeated contact with the debtor and his attorney both before and after the execution sale.
Pender, 265 P.2d at 648. This conduct was not an "affirmative action[]" of the creditor,
as the Attorneys claim. Nor does it show that the creditor deliberately misled the debtor,
as asserted by the Attorneys. It is passive conduct - i.e. "studious silence." Contrast the
"studious silence" of the creditor and his attorneys in Pender with the not-so-silent
Attorneys in the present case who (personally or through staff) affirmatively told Pyper
they would call him back and get him a payoff figure. The affirmative
misrepresentations in the present case clearly go above and beyond Pender's "studious

14

silence/' where that court affirmed the trial court's conclusi6n that the sale at issue there
"was attended by unfairness and was tainted with fraud." Id. at 648.
Similar to the redemption-period irregularities noted above in Pender and Young,
such irregularities ciw ,»ko be found in one of the three maii|i cases cited and quoted by
the Young court. In Graffam v. Burgess. 1 i T U.S. 180. 182 (1886), after the actual
sheriffs sale, the judgment-creditor Graffam "and the other! defendants meanwhile
conspired toge ther to keep [the debtor] in. ignorance oft] ic [sheriffs] saU • * •-• > =•
allowed by the statutes of Massachusetts for redeeming the property, had expired." Thus.
Graffam, Pender and Young all considered redemption-peribd irregularities in deciding
whether to equitably extend the redemption period.
4.

1 tut I r i.il i 'iMiii i .iiiiid Pyper Court Decisions Comport with Huston

The Attorneys argue that in affirming the Trial Court's ruling in favor of Pyper,
the Pyper court failed to follow Huston, supra. Specifically the Attorneys claim that the
controlling test ^ based on Huston and requires the following l\v» fau^r^ the hndinj of
exceptional circumstances as well as compelling equities. ([See, Brief of Appellants at

1

Although the Attorneys are loathe to expand the reach of equity, but quick to restrict it
Utah caselaw views equity differently. Equity is defined as "fairness" or the "body of
principles constituting what is fair and right." Black's Law Dictionary 443 (7th ed. 2000).
"The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties to the status quo to the extent
possible." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984), "It is inherent in the nature
and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so
demand. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). Another purpose of
equity "is the prevention of injustice . . ." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way
Concrete Forming. 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1987).

15). Apparently, jettisoning the two-part Young test (which the Attorneys asserted in
their Brief of Appellants to the Pyper court below),8 the Attorneys prefer another two-part
test containing seemingly different verbiage.
First, the Attorneys misstate Huston. After reviewing Young, Mollerup v. Storage
Systems International 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), and the applicable legal principles
therein, the Huston court concluded, "a court should take such an action only when the
equities of the case are compelling and 'move the conscience of the court."5 Huston, 818
P.2dat535.
Second, the antecedent source of the legal principles in Huston is Young. See,
e.g., Young 37 P. at 254 ("If the inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience
of all fair and impartial minds . . . " ) . Thus, these Huston principles are essentially
synonymous with the Young two-part test.
Third, the Trial Court concluded that the inadequacy of purchase price "shocks the
conscience of an impartial mind." (See, Memorandum Decision at 8). Regarding this
conclusion, the Pyper court stated, "We do not disagree with the district court's
determinations that the sale of Pyper*s $75,000 of equity in the property for $329 . . .
'shocks the conscience of an impartial mind5 . .." Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 at ^[12 n 5.
Thus, both courts below considered and used these Huston legal principles.
Further, it is self evident that both the Trial Court and Pyper court felt the equities
of the present case were compelling enough and provided exceptional circumstances
8

See, the Attorneys' Brief of Appellant submitted to the Pyper court at 11-12.
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sufficient to extend the redemption period. 1 he dissenting judge in Pvper. Judge Da\ is,
clearly indicated so in the open ing paragraph of his dissent. Id. at f22. For the Attorneys
to ignore the Young two-part test and then argue that the Pvj)er court erred in not
expressly stating that the equities of this case were compelling and s n ^ k ^ . i:conscience of the coi tit is to turn this dispute into a battle of semantics.
The Pyper decision thus comports with the equitable principles enumerated in
Huston relating to equitably extending the redemption period.

The A ttorneys5 concludi ng argument is that Pyper establishes bad precedent. The
Attorneys, however, support this allegation with conclusory [statements and a concerted
effort to conveniently turn a blind eye to the facts. I ruly; facts are stubborn things for the
Attorneys.
The Attorneys' doomsday claims of unwise precedent can be summarized as: (1) a
sheriffs sale can now be attacked at any time after the end of the redemption period by
merely alleging even the slimmest instances of unfairness. (2) debtors now nee :I do
nothing but sit idly by for 90% of the redemption period and then allege he or she made
several unreturned phone calls, and (3) even if a purchaser makes no affirmative actions
or representations during the redemption process the sale can still be attacked b\ merely
alleging the debtor made a fe\\ i in reti lined phone ca lis. (See, Brief of Appellants at 16).
These allegations of unwise precedent completely (and conveniently) ignore the
shocking sacrifice the Attorneys seek of Pyper's property - |a property valued at $125,000
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(when the liens were all removed) - for a paltry $329, and which still left the Attorneys
with their $10,577.23 judgment (less the $329 credit bid). No case cited by either side in
this dispute even comes close to providing a greater sacrifice of a debtor's property than
the present sacrifice sought by the Attorneys. The Attorneys clearly ignore this fact in
arguing 'unwise precedent.'
The Attorneys also ignore the fact that they and their staff affirmatively told Pyper
more than once on the telephone that they would get back to him with a payoff. The
Attorneys amazingly overlook this fact, and instead claim Pyper is simply relying on
unreturned phone calls, and that the Attorneys and their staff made no affirmative
representations to Pyper during the redemption period regarding a payoff which he relied
on. The Attorneys, of course, dispute this claiming that they and their staff never made
such representations. However, the Trial Court, as trier of fact, was on hand to observe
testimony from the parties and clearly weighed this disputed testimony in favor of Pyper.
(See, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact ^21-26, 44, and p. 8). The precedent
created by this critical fact (i.e. attorney purchasers at a sheriff sale misleading the debtor
during the redemption period) was established long ago with Young and Pender. Pyper
produces no new precedent on this point.
The Attorneys also ignore the undisputed fact that they are just that - attorneys.
They also previously represented Pyper. The line of cases demanding a thorough review
of lawyer conduct in similar cases started well before Pyper was decided. If such a fact
creates unwise precedent, then the whole line of cases beginning with Young needs to be
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o\ erti irned.
Further, the claim that Pyper sat idly by as the six month redemption period
transpired is a myth. Pyper testified at trial that during the redemption period he had to
clear title to his proper iy in order to obtain a loan against his properly that could pa\ off
the A ttorneys' ji idgrnent, and that he cleared four or five different liens during the
redemption period. (R. at 450, p. 90).9 One such encumbrance on title was a "large bank
lien" which Pyper was able to reconvey, thereby completely clearing title 10 lus property
except for the A ttorneys' judgment lien (R at 450, p. 90 -91). Pyper also helpe d his s :)ii
qualify for the bank loan that would be used, in part, to pay the Attorneys' judgment, and
which would be recorded against Pyper9s property'. (R. at 450, p. 94, 116). In addition to

rem;ir;e;! r.vMc. u,:-r. durir-2 ihc ^Icmp^-n neriod, contrary to the claims of the Attorneys
and Judge Davis.
Finally, at the end o; Luc rind ol Appellants, the Attorneys cite Mollerup v.
Storage Systems International 569 P 2d 1 ] 22 (I Jta h 1977) for its use of "substantial" to
modify the "irregularities" needed to upset a sheriffs sale. Id. at 1124. Although
Mollerup cites generally to Young for this conclusion, Your|g referenced the adjective
"substantial" just once. After the Young court stating its holding,11 ' it applied the holding

Copies of these trial transcript excerpts are included in tl le Appendix as exhib.it
number 3.
10

Young's holding is, "All the cases unite in the doctrine thjat on gross inadequacy of

to the specific facts before it: "This is not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of price
alone, but one where the sales complained of were attended by such substantial
irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum." Young, 37 P. at 254 (emphasis
added). This reference in Young to the adjective "substantial" does not modify Young's
holding. Instead, this adjective merely characterizes the facts before the Young court and
indicates that such facts meet and exceed the second part of the two-part Young test,
which requires only that "irregularities" attend the sale.
This interpretation of Young's use of the adjective "substantial" is confirmed in
Schroeder, supra, where the United States Supreme Court affirmed Young. In Schroeder,
the court held: "the general proposition laid down, as above stated, that if, [1] in addition
to inadequacy of price [2] there be other circumstances throwing a shadow upon the
fairness of the transaction, the judgment debtor will be allowed to redeem." Schroeder,
161 U.S. at 339-340 (emphasis and numbers added). Interestingly, in analyzing and restating Young's holding, the Schroeder court completely omitted the adjective
"substantial." Instead, "slight" was the only adjective Schroeder used to modify
"irregularities." Id. at 340 (citations omitted). This use of "slight" by Schroeder was in
the case where a creditor's lawyer was the purchaser at the sheriffs sale (id. at 340), the
same situation in the present appeal.

price, coupled with irregularities attending the sale . . . it is the duty of the courts to set
the sale aside . . ." Young, 37 P. at 254 (citations omitted).
20

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals5 decision in
Pyper.
th
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LexisNexis®
LEXSEE 37 P. 252

Positive
As of: May 10,2010
JOHN M. YOUNG, RESPONDENT, v. A. T. SCHROEDER AND WIFE, APPELLANTS. '
1

Appealed to the Supreme court of the United States, July 31, 1894.
No. 437.
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
10 Utah 155; 37P. 252; 1894 Utah LEXIS23

June 4,1894, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1] APPEAL from the district court of the third judicial district, Hon. G. W.
Bartch, Judge.
Action by John M. Young against A. T. Schroeder
and wife to obtain a decree adjudging certain deeds, executed by the U.S. marshal pursuant to certain execution
sales, to be fraudulent, and that the plaintiff be permitted
to redeem from such sales, notwithstanding the statutory
time for redemption had expired, and that the defendants
be required to convey to him the property mentioned and
described in said deeds. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
DISPOSITION:

Affirmed.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff debtor filed suit
against defendant attorneys to obtain a decree adjudging
certain deeds to be fraudulent and an order that the
debtor be permitted to redeem the property and that the
attorneys be required to convey the property to him. The
District Court, Third Judicial District (Utah), entered a
decree for the debtor. The attorneys appealed.
OVERVIEW: A corporation obtained a default judgment against the debtor in the amount of about $ L600.

The attorneys represented the corporation in that suit.
The debtor and his sister obtained property as tenants in
common. The property was worth $ 25,000. An execution was4ater issued4o a,U.S. marshal, directing him to
levy on sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment. The marshal attached and levied on all the debtor's
property after being unable to find personal property.
The attorneys purchased two lots for themselves at the
execution sales. The attorneys told the debtor that the
statutory time for redemption would not be insisted upon.
As a result, the debtor allowed the period for redemption
to lapse. Before bringing suit, the debtor offered to pay
the attorneys the full amount of the corporation's judgment against him, but they refused. On appeal, the court
held that the district court properly awarded the debtor
relief because not only was there a gross inadequacy of
price, the record showed that the attorneys, who became
purchasers, so directed and controlled the officer charged
with the duty of executing the writ as to lead to a sacrifice of the debtor's property.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the district court's decree.
CORE TERMS: feet, parcel, marshal irregularity,
thence, levy, redemption, purchaser, levied, thence north,
inadequacy, sacrifice, partition, thence east, plat, judgment debtor, cotenant, deed, inadequacy of price, ex-

rd^p

A
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pired, decree, corner, block, judgment creditor, fair price,
execution sales, attended, insisted, redeem, notice
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresentation > General Overview
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Presumptions
Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Rebuttal of
Presumptions
[HN1] Whenever the court perceives that a sale of property has been made at a grossly inadequate price, such as
would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a
strong, and, in general, a conclusive, presumption,
though there be no direct proof of fraud, that an undue
advantage has been taken of the ignorance, weakness, or
the distress or necessity of the vendor; and this imposes
on the purchaser a necessity to remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence of fairness of his conduct.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresentation > General Overview
[HN2] If the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock
the conscience, or if, in addition to gross inadequacy, the
purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness, or has taken
any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property or
party interested has been for any other reason misled or
surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent
and void, or the party injured will be permitted to redeem
the property sold. Great inadequacy requires only slight
circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party
benefited by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud.

Civil Procedure > Equity > General Overview
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers & Objections > Affirmative Defenses > Laches
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
[HNS] On gross inadequacy of price, coupled with irregularities attending the sale, especially where such
irregularities are not merely formal and technical, but
such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of
a fair price for the property sold, and are attributable to
the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of the courts to set
the sale aside, unless the complaining party is estopped
by his own laches.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
Real Property Law > Deeds > Enforceability
Real Property Law > Estates > Concurrent Ownership
> General Overview
[HN4] The purqhase of the grantor's interest in a specified parcel is, in effect, a wager that such parcel will be
set off to him on partition, or otherwise confirmed to him
by the other cot£nants. Still, if such circumstances exist
that the grantor sees fit to make, and the grantee to accept, a conveyance which may, in the event of an unfavorable partitioij convey nothing, there is no valid reason for denying ihe utmost effect to the deed which it can
be given, consisi ently with the rights of the other cotenants. But in the case of an involuntary transfer of property, the interest of the person whose estate is to be diDmpuls:ion ought to be carefully considered
vested by co:
and jealously guarded... If an officer may lawfully levy on
a specific parcel and subject it to forced sale, he may
thereby sacrificq the property of the defendant, for few
persons would be found willing to bid for that which,
when purchased, consisted of a mere contingent interest,
an interest which the other cotenants were not bound to
notice, and whiqh might be finally lost upon a partition
of the common property. Hence the rule is that the levy
and sale of the debtor's interest in a specific part of the
lands cannot be sustained.

Civil Procedure \> Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresentation > General Overview
Legal Ethics > Client Relations > Conflicts of Interest
[HN5] A purchase by an attorney for his own benefit at a
sale over which he has exercised any direction or control
should always be closely scrutinized by the court. Public
policy and the analogies of the law require that they
should be considered per se as in the twilight between
legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust I for the debtor, upon slight additional
facts.
HEADNOTES
1. EXECUTION SALE.-IRREGULARITIES.EQUITABLE ^ELIEF.-ESTOPPEL IN PAIS.SEMBLE.-Whei land worth $ 26,000, is sold in separate parcels to sa^isfy a judgment of $ 1,700, and the purchasers at all th^ execution sales except one are the attorneys of the judgment creditor, and that to the extent of
furnishing the officer with descriptions of the property to
be levied upon and sold, they directed and controlled the
processes of the court and directed and required the officer to levy upon and sell the property in such parcels as
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rendered it impossible to realize at the sale a fair price,
but led to a sacrifice of the debtor's property, such sales
will be set aside and the judgment debtor allowed to redeem on an equitable basis even after the statutory time
for redemption has expired, especially when the sales
were attended with many and serious irregularities for
which the parties claiming through the sales were responsible, and when one of the attorneys of the judgment
creditor assured the judgment debtor that the statutory
period of redemption would not be insisted upon, who
relied upon this assurance and allowed the period of redemption to elapse. Semble, that the conduct of one
member of a firm or copartnership not a party to the suit,
about a matter not within the general scope of the partnership business, sufficient to create an estoppel against
him, operates so as to bind another member of the firm
sought to be charged, who had no knowledge of and did
not participate in the acts creating the estoppel.

365. The mere relation of joint ownership of property is
not enough to constitute each owner [***2] the agent of
the other to bind him by fraud. 1 Bige. on Fraud, 223.
Plaintiff and his cotenants had divided the land into distinct lots, and a conveyance of all plaintiffs interest in
any one lot is valid and effectual against his cotenants.
Freeman on Coten. 282, § 208; Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich
53; S, C. 12 Am; Rep. 218; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns.
355.

COUNSEL: Messrs. Rawlins & Critchlow and Messrs.
Jones & Schroeder, for appellants.

The court found that at the date of the first sale, Stephens
did not know of the existence of any other property, and
then in another finding that he had formed an intention to
exhaust all of plaintiffs property. Inconsistent findings
will not sustain a judgment. Reese v. Corcoran, 52 Cal.
495; Manley v. Howlet, 55 Cal. 94; Harris v. Harris, 59
Cal 116; Kloss v. Alleman, 64 Cal. 87. There were three
separate sales under two different executions. The court
cannot grant entire relief in one action unless there was a
common fraudulent intent as to all. Finding 10 makes
such intent impossible. 2 Comp. Laws, § 3220; Wallen v.
Ruskan, 12 How. Pr. 28; Henderson v. Jackson, 40 How.
Pr. 168. As long as a judicial sale stands, the purchase
price as between the parties is a conclusive test of its
value. Snyder v. Blair, 33 N. J. Eq. [***3] 208. Where
there is a conflict of evidence on material issues, the
finding of the court is not conclusive on appeal, like the
verdict of a jury or the finding of a common law court,
and the supreme court will review the facts as well as the
4 a w . - ^ ^ ^ v r ^ ^ t o , - ^ ^ ^ ^ - 7^2;-Sr €.-1 -7-S.- Wr R,
706; Cheney v. Roodhouse, 135 Ills. 25; Droster v. Mueller, 103 Mo. 624; U. S. v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427; 37
L. Ed. 587. Fraud on the part of the purchaser must be
shown, in addition to inadequacy of consideration. Simmons v. Vandegrift, 1 N. J. Eq. 55. There must be fraud
to give a court of equity jurisdiction. Irregularity is not
sufficient. Cavanaugh v. Jakeway, Walker Ch. 344;
Hansford v. Barber, 3 A. K. Smith, 515. Some knowledge and participation in the act claimed to be fraudulent
must be proved upon the party sought to be charged. The
mere relationship of joint ownership to the property is
not enough to constitute each owner the agent of the
other to bind him by false representations in an unauthorized sale of the whole property. Bige. on Fraud, 223;
Holmes v. Wood, 32 Ind. 201; Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N.
Y 400; Peny v. Hale, 143 Mass. 540; S C. 10 N. E. 174.

The court erred in permitting plaintiff to testify about a
conversation had with Stephens relative to the redemption of the property. Stephens is not a party to the suit,
and it related to a matter foreign to the scope of the partnership business. At the time plaintiff did not know that
either Stephens or Schroeder had any interest in or control over the property. Jackson v. Bartless, 8 Johns. 381;
4 L. Ed. 57; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Fed. Cas. 851, No.

The court nowhere [***4] finds that the defendant is
guilty of actual fraud, and a failure so to find is equivalent to a finding against the plaintiff. Elliot App. Proc. §
757; Young v. Berger, 32 N. E. 318. Even where the
price paid is inadequate, in order to avoid the sale, it
must be shown that the purchaser is in some measure
responsible for it. White v. Wilson, 14 Ves. Jr. 151;
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180; Russel v. Pew, 31 P.

2. ID.--ID.--GROSS INADEQUACY OF PRICE.LACHES.— Courts will set aside execution sales when it
appears that the price obtained was grossly inadequate,
and that the sales were coupled with irregularities, not
merely formal and technical, but such as have a direct
tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the
property sold, when such irregularities are attributable to
the purchasers at the sales, unless the complaining party
is estopped by his own laches.
3. ID.--ID.--EXCESSIVE LEVY.-VOID SALE.Where- an-exeoution-was i&sued-and -the officer-levied-it
upon and sold certain property of the judgment debtor
and returned it into court unsatisfied to the amount of $
136, and another execution was issued which the officer
levied upon certain other property of the judgment
debtor, which he afterwards sold to satisfy the alleged
balance of $ 136, and after deducting his fees, expenses
and commissions therefrom amounting to $ 30, paid the
balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of the judgment creditor,
when in fact, there was only $ 25.57 due at the time of
issuing the last execution. Held, that this was not an irregularity, merely such as would render the sale voidable, but the levy and sale being excessive, the sale was
absolutely void.

10 Utah 155, *, 37 P 252, **,
1894 Utah LEXIS 23,***
R 77, Hudgens v Monow, 47 Ark 515 The plamtiff
the judgment debtor, knew of the execution sales and
could have directed the officer, and havmg failed to do
so cannot now complam of his own negligence 2 Comp
Laws, § 3436, Jones v Townsend (Tenn), 5 Cen Law J
202 Where there is time for redemption allowed by law,
the judgment debtor must redeem or make a motion to
have the sale set aside before the time of redemption
expires Powers v Larabee, 57 N W 791, and cases
Jones v Townsend (Tenn), 5 Cent Law J 202. Coolbaugh v Roemer 32 Minn 445, Jenkins v Memweather, 109 III 647, Stewart v Marshal, 4 G Green
(la), 75, State Bank v Noland, 13 Aik 299 Love v
Cherry, 24 la 210, Chambers v Stone 9 Ala 260,Abercrombie v Conner, 10 Ala 292, 2 [r***>'5] Freeman on
Exec § 306, p 1039, Fletcher v McGill 110 Ind 406,
Rigneyv Small, 60111 416, Johnson v Murray, 112 Lid
154, Richey v Merritt, 108Ind 347, 9N E 368, Levari
v Milholland, 114 Pa St 49
In order to create an estoppel m pais, the representation
must relate to a present or a past state of thmgs Langton
v Doud, 10 Allen, 433, Jackson v Allen, 120 Mass 79,
White v Ashton, 51 N Y 280 An estoppel from the representation of a party can seldom arise, except where the
representations relate to a fact, to a present or past state
of thmgs Union Life Ins Co v Mowry, 96 U S 549, 24
L Ed 676 The party estopped must have intended that
his misrepresentations should be acted upon by the party
who asserts the estoppel Zuchtman v Roberts, 109
Mass 53 An attorney may purchase at an execution sale
subject to the right of his client to claim the benefit
thereof Smith v Black 115 US 308, 29 L Ed 398,
Allen v Gillett, 127 US 589, 32 L Ed 271, Mining Co
v Mason, 145 US 340, 36 L Ed 736 A levy upon part
of a tract held as tenant in common is good as against
judgment debtor The only persons who can complam are
his cotenants Gregoiy [***~6] v Tozier, 24 Me 308,
Goodwin v Gregg, 28 Me 188, Varnum v Abbott, 7
Am Dec 87 In case the officer, after offermg the property separately, sells en masse, such a sale is good Hill v
F M N B, 97 US 450, Van Valkenbergv Trustees, 66
III 103,Muggev Ginger, 59 Ind 195
Mr W H Dickson and Messrs Williams, Van Cott &
Sutherland, for respondents
JUDGES: MERRITT, C J MINER and SMITH, JJ,
concur
OPINION BY: MERRITT
OPINION
[160] [**252] MERRITT, C J

This action! was brought to obtam a decree of the
court adjudging certain deeds (mentioned m the complaint, and executed by the Umted States marshal of
Utah territory pursuant to certain execution sales made
under a judgment obtamed in the third district court by
Clark Eldredge & Co, a corporation, against John M
Young, the plaintiff, and others) to be fraudulent, and
that the plamtiff be permitted to redeem from such sales,
notwithstanding the statutory time for redemption had
expired, and that defendants be required to convey to
him the property mentioned and described m said deeds
and complamt This relief was sought on the ground of
gross inadequacy of the price obtamed at such sales
coupled with [y *7] a great number of irregularities
attending the sales, which led to the sacrifice of plamtiff s property The alleged irregularities are specifically
set forth m the complaint, and also in the findings of the
court below Upon the filing of the complamt the defendants Frank B Stephens and wife [ ^ l ] made a satisfactory settlement with the plamtiff, and in pursuance
thereof conveyed to him all their interests m the property
m controversy, and the suit as to these defendants was
thereupon dismissed After that the defendants Schroeder
and wife filed their answer, and a trial was had, which
resulted in a judgment and decree m favor of plamtiff
substantially as prayed for m the complamt, from which
decree, and the d>rder denymg a new trial, this appeal is
prosecuted
The finding^ of fact made by the court below are
very full We have carefully examined the record, and
are satisfied that they are fully sustamed by the evidence
From these findings it appears that on the 9th of February, 1891, ClarkJ Eldredge & Co, a corporation, commenced an action agamst John M Young (the plamtiff
herein), Henry Gpddard, and George Goddard to recover
$ 1,640 61, with interest from p"*^] January 3, 1891
That afterwards a judgment by default was entered
agamst the plamtiff (John M Young) on March 6, 1891,
for $ 1,673 36, knd costs amounting to $ 30 50, said
judgment bearing mterest at 1 per cent per month That
Frank B Stephens and A T Schroeder, partners, were
the attorneys for Clark, Eldredge & Co m said action,
that the plamtiff, John M Young, and his sister, Lydia Y
Merrill, were the owners m fee, as tenants m common, of
all of that part of lot 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City
survey, commencing 64 1/2 feet west from the northeast
corner of said lot 2, thence west 611/2 feet, thence south
20 rods, thence east 94 1/2 feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet,
thence east 311/2 feet, thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence
west 16 1/2 feet, thence north 148 1/2 feet, thence west
48 feet, thence north 49 1/2 feet, to the place of beginning, and also lot 12 m block 8, Five-Acre Plat A, Big
Field survey, m Salt Lake county, Utah That the title of
the plamtiff and Lydia Y Merrill in each of said properties [^162] was derived from the last will and testament
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of John Young, deceased, father of said John M. Young
and Lydia Y. Merrill, and was subject to a right [***9]
in Sarah Milton Young and Ann Olive Young to receive
each one-fourth of the income arising from said properties during their respective lives. That the plaintiffs interest in said portion of lot 2 at the times of the sales
hereinafter mentioned was worth at least the sum of $
25,000, and his interest in said lot 12 was worth at least $
1,000. (There is an alley extending from north to south
practically through the center of said portion of said lot
2.) That on the 29th day of April, 1891, an execution was
issued in said action of Clark, Eldredge & Co. to the
United States marshal, directing him to levy on sufficient
personal property to satisfy said judgment, and, if sufficient personal property could not be found, then to levy
on the real estate belonging to the defendants in said action; and the marshal, being unable to find any personal
property out of which to satisfy said judgment, did, on
May 7, 1891, give notice that he attached and levied on
[**253] all the right, title, claim, and interest of said
plaintiff and his codefendants in said action in and to that
certain parcel of land described as beginning 101 feet
north and 39 1/2 feet east of the south-west corner of lot
[***10] 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City survey, running thence east 15 1/2 feet, thence north 28 feet, thence
west 15 1/2 feet, thence south 28 feet, to the place of
beginning; and also on that part of the same lot described
as beginning 32 1/2 feet west from the southeast corner
of said lot, running thence west 38 feet, thence north 98
1/3 feet>Jhence_east 38 f^t^thence_south^9_8_l/3_feet, to
the place of beginning; and also on a part of lot 12, block
8, Five-Acre Plat A, Big Field survey. That part of said
lot 2 secondly described in said notice lies on the east
side of said alley, while that portion firstly described in
the notice lies on the west side. This last-mentioned portion was [*163] carved out of the heart of that portion
of said lot 2 owned as aforesaid by plaintiff and his sister, and there was no means of ingress to or egress from
this portion so carved out of the larger tract. That the
marshal, by his return, dated July 25, 1891, certified that
under said writ he had sold the property described in the
notice to John Clark, and, deducting his commissions
and expenses of sale, paid the balance realized upon said
sale, viz., $ 962.36, to the attorneys of Clark, Eldredge
[***11] & Co., and further returned that there was still
due and unpaid on said judgment the sum of $ 886.90.
(The John Clark mentioned in the return was a director
and the principal stockholder of Clark, Eldredge & Co.)
On July 28, 1891, an alias execution issued from the
said court in said action for the full sum of $ 1,673.36
and $ 30.50 costs, directed to said marshal, and thereafter
the marshal made return thereon to said court that he had
levied on all the right, title, claim, and interest of said
plaintiff and his codefendants in said action in and to that
certain parcel of land described as beginning 64 1/2 feet

west of the northeast corner of said lot 2, running thence
west 45 1/2 feet, thence south 20 rods, thence east 78 1/2
feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/4 feet,
thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, thence
north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence north 49
1/2 feet, to the place of beginning; and certified by said
return that he had sold all the premises last described to
the said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder for the
sum of $ 828.70: and further certified that the judgment
obtained by said corporation was still unsatisfied to the
extent [***12] of $ 100. (The marshal's return was erroneous in this: that the true balance was less than $ 26.)
On the 30th of September, 1891, said marshal made a
further return to said last-mentioned writ, in which he
certified that on September 30, 1891, he sold all of lot
12, block 8, Five-Acre [*164] Plat A, Big Field survey,
situate in Salt Lake county, and also all that certain parcel of land described as beginning 39 feet east and 81
feet north of the southwest corner of said lot 2, running
thence north 209 feet, thence east 16 1/2 feet, thence
south 209 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, to the place of
beginning, to said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder, for the sum of $ 136; and that, deducting the costs
and expenses of said last levy, amounting to $ 30, paid
the balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of said Clark, Eldredge & Co., and returned said writ fully satisfied. All
of that part of lot 2 firstly described in this statement, a
plat of which appears in the record, constitutes a single
parcel of land, and should be regarded and treated as
such, and no^ as Jbeingdiyided into separate lots_ or pareels; and each and every parcel of said lot 2, block 70,
plat A, so sold under said several [***13] writs of execution, was a part and portion of that part of said lot 2
which the said John M. Young derived title to under the
will of John Young, deceased, as aforesaid.
It further appears that said Stephens furnished the
marshal from time to time, with a description of the
property to be levied upon and sold under said executions, and that the officer did levy and sell, from time to
time, according to the descriptions furnished him by said
Stephens. That the property so sold to said Clark was
afterwards, and prior to the commencement of this action, conveyed by Clark by quitclaim deed to said
Stephens & Shroeder, and that the same was bid in by
said Stephens for said Clark. That the other portions of
said lot 2, sold under said several executions, and said lot
12, were bid in at said sales by Stephens for himself and
Shroeder, and that at none of said sales was there any
other bidder than Stephens, nor was either of said sales
attended by any person other than Stephens and the officer conducting the sales. At the time the last of these
sales was made, to-wit, on 30th September [*165] 1891,
the balance due Clark, Eldredge & Co. on said judgment
amounted to $ 25.57, and no more, [***14] while the
property of the plaintiff was sold for $ 136 at such sale, $
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106 of which was by the marshal paid to Stephens &
Schrooder, no part of which was ever accounted for to
plaintiff It further appears that after said several sales
had been made and before the time for redemption had
expired, Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory
time for redemption would not be insisted upon, that the
plaintiff, believing and relymg upon such promise and
assurance, allowed the period for redemption to elapse
without redeeming any of said property from said sales,
and that marshal's deeds were given to the purchasers at
said sales in pursuance of the statute m such cases made
and provided It further appears that said lot 12 had been
sold for taxes for the year 1890, and also for the year
1891 and that m the month of April, 1892, after Schroeder had obtained the marshal's deed for said lot 12, he
was informed that the plaintiff was about to redeem said
lot 12 from both of said [**v*254] tax sales, and that he
well understood at the time that plaintiff was unaware of
the fact that said lot 12 had been sold under execution,
nevertheless he permitted the plaintiff to redeem said
[***15] property from said tax sales, and purposely
concealed from him the fact that said property had been
so sold under execution, and that he and his partner.
Stephens, then held the marshal's deed therefor
It further appears from the record that it was the design and purpose of Stephens & Schroeder at the outset
to exhaust, if possible, all the property of plaintiff, of
whatever nature or description, regardless of its value,
under said several executions, and that they m fact accomplished that purpose Prior to the commencement of
this action, plaintiff offered to pay to Stephens &
Schroeder the full amount of the Clark, Eldredge & Co
judgment, [*166] together with the mterest thereon at
the rate of 1 per cent per month, to compensate Stephens
& Schroeder liberally for all services and trouble that
they had rendered or been put to m the premises, to repay
all or any advances which they, or either of them, might
have made on account of the property, with mterest
thereon, and, in addition, to give them a bonus of $ 1,000
if they would reconvey said properties to plaintiff, which
offer they declmed and refused to accept Such, m brief,
is the history of the transaction by [r'*'v16] which the
plaintiff was stripped of all his possessions, and his
property, worth at the tune $ 26 000 or more, was taken
to satisfy a judgment of about $ 1,700 An additional
feature of the transaction is that Stephens & Schroeder
were members of the bar. attorneys for the judgment
creditors, who thus, under the forms of law and the processes of the court, sought to enrich themselves without
any consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor,
and who proceeded m disregard of the injustice and oppression to which he was thereby subjected
It is this transaction which appellants ask this court
to approve We find ourselves unable to yield to the ap-

peal We may sdy, with the supreme court of the United
States m the case of Byers v Surget, infra "It seems
pertinent here to inquire under what system of civil polity, under what code of law or ethics, a transaction like
that disclosed by the record m this case can be excused
or even palliated " It is insisted by appellants that mere
madequacy of price, however gross, will not authorize
the courts to set aside a judicial sale The general rule
undoubtedly is pat mere madequacy of price, alone,
does not authorize the [ y r r 17] disturbance of such a
sale, but we are not prepared to sanction the unqualified
statement of the rule as put by appellants' counsel If the
madequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience
of all fair and Hi67] impartial mmds, if the sacrifice is
such that every honest man would hesitate to take advantage of it, it maw well be doubted whether every such
case would be beyond the power of a court of equity to
relieve against
In Byers v Surget 19 How (U S ), it is said on page
311 "To meet the objection made to the sale m this case,
founded upon thi madequacy of the price for which the
land was sold, it is msisted that the madequacy of consideration simply cannot amount to proof of fraud This
position, however, is scarcely reconcilable with the
qualification annexed to it by the courts, viz, unless such
madequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience, for
this qualification implies necessarily the affirmation that,
if the madequacy be of a nature so gross as to shock the
conscience, it will amount to proof of fraud" In the case
of Butler v Haskell, 4 Desaus Eq 651, the chancellor
says "I consider the result of the great body of the cases
[****18] to be that, [HN1] wherever the court perceives
that a sale of property has been made at a grossly inadequate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this
madequacy furnishes a strong, and, m general, a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct proof of
fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the
ignorance, weakness, or the distress or necessity of the
vendor, and this imposes on the purchaser a necessity to
remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence
of fairness of his Conduct"
In Graffam -\\ Burgess, 117 US 180, 6 S Ct 686,
29 L Ed 839, the supreme court of the United States
says "From the cjases here cited we may draw the general conclusion
[HN2] if the madequacy of price is
so gross as to shejek the conscience, or if, m addition to
gross madequacy] the purchaser has been guilty of any
unfairness, or ha^ taken any undue advantage, or if the
owner of the proberty or party mterested has been for
any other reason misled or surprised, then the sale will be
regarded as frauqulent and void, or [168] the party
injured will be pi amitted to redeem the property sold
Great madequacy requires only slight circumstances of
unfairness m the i***19] conduct of the party benefited
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by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud" All the
cases unite in the doctrine that [HN3] on gross inadequacy of price, coupled with irregularities attending the
sale, especially where such irregularities are not merely
formal and technical, but such as have a direct tendency
to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property
sold, and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is
the duty of the courts to set the sale aside, unless the
complaining party is estopped by his own laches
Chamblee v Tarbox, 84 Am Dec 614, Howell v Baker,
4 Johns Ch 118, Nesbitt v Dallam, 28 Am Dec 236,
Morris v Robey 73 III 462, Byers v Surget, 60 US
303, 19 HOW 303, 15 L Ed 670, Graffam v Burgess,
117 US 180 6S Ct 686 29L Ed 839
This is not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of
price alone, but one where the sales complamed of were
attended by such substantial irregularities as must have
prevented a sale at a fair sum For instance, one of the
parcels of said lot 2 levied upon and sold under the first
execution, is described [*w255] as beginning 101 feet
north and 39 1/2 feet [^^^20] east of the southwest corner of said lot 2, thence east 15 1/2 feet, north 28 feet,
west 15 1/2 feet, and south 28 feet to the beginning Reference to the plat in evidence shows that the property
thus described is a portion of that part of lot 2 to which
plaintiff and his sister derived title through the will of
their deceased father, as before stated, and is mcluded
within the exterior boundaries of that portion thereof
shownjby thejecord tojhaye been, at that time leased_to
one Gebhardt The purchaser of the part thus levied on
and sold by the marshal acquired a piece of land havmg
no means of access to it It is needless to say that such a
transaction must necessarily result in a sacrifice of the
property Again, in the sales made under [*169] the
several executions of portions of said lot 2 it appears that
in each instance the levy was upon and the sale of all the
plaintiffs right, title, and interest in a specific part of the
portion of said lot 2 so owned by him and his sister,
Lydia Y Merrill This is also an irregularity that renders
the sale voidable, if not void, the necessary tendency of a
sale under such a levy being to depreciate the value of
the property sold
[^v*v*21] In Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition
(section 216), under the headmg of "Conveyance of Part
under Execution," it is said "We have already seen that
the decisions determining the effect of a conveyance
made by a cotenant, and purporting to convey his mterest
m some specified parcel, are very inharmonious The
reasons which exist m the case of a voluntary are somewhat different from those accompanymg an involuntary
conveyance [HN4] The purchase of the grantor's mterest
in a specified parcel is, m effect, a wager that such parcel
will be set off to him on partition, or otherwise confirmed to him by the other cotenants Still, if such cir-

cumstances exist that the grantor sees fit to make, and the
grantee to accept, a conveyance which may, in the event
of an unfavorable partition, convey nothing, we can see
no \alid reason for denymg the utmost effect to the deed
which it can be given, consistently with the rights of the
other cotenants But in the case of an involuntary transfer
of property the mterest of the person whose estate is to
be divested by compulsion ought to be carefully considered and jealously guarded If an officer may lawfully
levy on a specific parcel and subject [v***v'22] it to forced
sale, he may thereby sacrifice the property of the defendant, for few persons would be found willing to bid for
that which, when purchased, consisted of a mere contingent interest,--an mterest which the other cotenants were
not bound to notice, and which might be finally lost upon
a partition of the common property [*170] Hence the
rule, supported by a decided preponderance of the authorities, is that the levy and sale of the debtor's interest
in a specific part of the lands cannot be sustamed" See
also, Starr v Leavitt, 2 Conn 243, Smith v Benson 9 Vt
138 and the cases cited m note to Smith v Huntoon (III
Sup), 134III 24, 24NE 971, 23 Am St Rep 651
The rights of the cotenants of the judgment are not
affected by the sale In proceedmgs instituted by them
for partition of the common property they can ignore the
same, and the result of the partition may be to deprive
the purchaser at such judicial sale of that which he bid
and paid for Such bemg the hazard which the purchaser
must necessarily take^ it is not reasonable to suppose that
any one would bid a fair price for the property The wisdom of the rule announced [^^^23] in the cases just
cited is exemplified by the facts of this case That part of
lot 2 m controversy is but 94 1/2 feet m width east and
west It is cut through the center from north to south by
an alleyway, and the record discloses that it could be
most equitably divided between the cotenants. the plaintiff and his sister, by allotting to one all of that part lymg
on the east, and to the other all that lying on the west, of
the alley But it will be remembered that under the first
execution issued on the Clark, Eldredge & Co judgment
the marshal levied on and sold two parcels of said lot 2.
one of which lies on the east side of the alley and the
other near the center of that portion situate on the west
side
Now, if Lydia Y Merrill, the cotenant of the plaintiff, or those claiming under her, should commence suit
for partition, it would be found impracticable to make
such a division of the property as she or they would be
entitled to without ignoring one or the other of these
sales The court called upon to make partition would be
constrained to ignore such sales, or at least one of them
Moreover, at the tune the last sale was made under the
executions [**171] mentioned, the [***24] balance remaining unpaid on the Clark, Eldredge & Co judgment
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amounted to $ 25 57, and no more, yet the officer levied
upon and sold property of Young to satisfy an alleged
balance of $ 136. and, after deductmg his fees, expenses,
and commissions therefrom, paid the balance, $ 106, to
Stephens & Schroeder, who retamed the same ever after
This was not an irregularity merely, such as would render the sale voidable, but, the levy and sale being excessive, the sale was absolutely void Ghdden v Chase, 56
Am Dec 690 Patterson v Corneal, 13 Am Dec 208.
Hastings v Johnson, 1 Nev 613
It will be observed that the purchasers at all the execution sales complamed of except the first were the attorneys for the judgment creditor, that to the extent of
furnishing the officer with the descriptions of the property to be levied on and sold by him under the executions, they directed and controlled the processes of the
court, and directed and required the officer to levy upon
and sell the property in such parcels as rendered it impossible to realize at the sales a fair price therefor [HN5]
A purchase [**256] by an attorney for his own benefit
at a sale over which [*"x**25] he has exercised any direction or control should always be closely scrutinized by
the court In Jones v Martin, 80 Am Dec 641, speakmg
of such purchases, the court says "Public policy and the
analogies of the law require that they should be considered per se as m the twilight between legal fraud and
fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or m trust for
the debtor, upon slight additional facts " See Howell v
5tffer,4Johns Ch 117, Byersv Surget, 60 US 303, 19
HOW303, 15 L Ed 670 And where, as m this case, the
attorneys, who became purchasers, have so directed and
controlled the officer charged with the duty of executmg
the writ as to lead to a sacrifice of the debtor's property,
the court will not hesitate to grant relief
[y172] It is contended by the appellants that relief
cannot be granted m this case, because the statutory period for redemption had expired before this suit was
brought The cases are by no means rare where a court of

equity has interfered to set aside a sale after the time for
redemption has expired, such sale having been attended
by irregularities and havmg resulted m a gross sacrifice
of the judgmenj [vr'w26] debtor's property Morris v
Robe)>, 73*111 462, Blight's Heirs v Tobin. 18 Am Dec
219. Bullen v Dawson (III Sup), 139 III 633, 29 NE
1038, Graffam J Burgess, 111 US 180, 6S Ct 686, 29
L Ed 839 We may add that it appears from the record
that the plaintiff was assured by Mr Stephens, before the
period for redemption had expired, that the statutory period would not be msisted upon, and it comes with bad
grace from the defendant now to urge that the plaintiff
should be estopped by the fact that he relied upon that
promise It is true that this assurance was given, not by
defendant Schroeder, but by his partner, Stephens They,
however, were acting m concert engaged m a jomt venture, and all the acts and declarations of Stephens in connection with the sales and purchases m question were,
under the circumstances disclosed by this record, binding
upon the defendant Schroeder Blight's Heirs v Tobin*
18 Am Dec 219
We have made a careful examination of the record m
connection with ipe numerous errors assigned on the part
of the appellants, and have been unable to find any error
which would call for a reversal of the decree [^^21] of
the court below [The fact that there was a gross sacrifice
of the judgment debtor's property at these sales is proved
beyond controversy In the same manner it is established
that these sales were attended by many and serious irregularities, for which the parties claiming through these
sales were directly responsible Where such facts are
clearly established by the evidence, and a decree is pronounced [*173] permitting redemption on an equitable
basis, it will not be disturbed because of any technical
errors m the trial of the case Let the order and decree
appealed from be affirmed
MINER and ^MITH, JJ , concur
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PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH.
THIS was a complaint in the nature of a bill in equity, originally filed in the Third Judicial District Court
of the Territory of Utah, by John M. Young against
Frank E. Stephens and wife and Albert T. Schroeder and
wife, as defendants, to set aside and cancel certain execution sales of real property in Salt Lake City as fraudulent
and void, and for permission to redeem from such sales,
notwithstanding the expiration of the statutory time for
redemption, and for a decree compelling the defendants
to convey to the plaintiff the property mentioned, upon
just and equitable terms.
The material facts in the case were that, on March 6,
1891, Clark, Eldredge & Co., a corporation, obtained
judgment by default in said court against the appellee
John M. Young, Henry Goddard, and George Goddard in
the sum of $1673.36, with $30.60 costs. Frank B.
Stephens and Albert T. Schroeder, partners and the principal defendants, were the attorneys for Clark, Eldredge
& Co. in such action. The plaintiff John M. Young was
the owner of the undivided one half of two parcels of
land in Salt Lake City, and plaintiffs sister, Lydia Y.
Merrill, was the owner of the other undivided one half of
the said parcels. Their title was derived from the will of
their father, and, as to the greater part of such property,
was subject to a right in Sarah Milton Young and Ann
Olive Young to receive each one fourth of the money
arising from said property during their respective lives.

On April 29|, 1881, an execution was issued in said
action of Clark, Eldredge & Co. against John M. Young,
directing the marshal of the United States, if sufficient
personal property could not be found to satisfy the judgment, to levy upon the real estate belonging to Young
and his codefendpnts in such action; and on May 7, 1891,
the marshal gave notice that he attached and levied on all
the right, title, c| aim, and interest of the said John M.
Young and his cddefendants in and to that parcel of land
described as beginning 101 feet north, and 39 1/2 feet
east of the S.W. Lorner of lot 2, block 70, plat "A," Salt
Lake City survey, and running thence east 15 1/2 feet,
thence north 28 feet, thence west 15 1/2 feet, thence
south 28 feet to the place of beginning; and also on that
part of the same lot described as beginning 32 1/2 feet
west from the S.E. corner of the said lot, running thence
west 38 feet, thence north 98 1/3 feet, thence east 38 feet,
thence south 98 1/3 feet to the place of beginning; and
also on a part of (lot 12, block 8, five acre plat "A," Big
Field survey.
Afterwards, on July 25, 1891, the marshal certified
that he had sold jthe property described in the notice to
John Clark, andj deducting his commissions and expenses of sale, p; id the balance realized upon said sale,
viz., $962.36, to the attorneys of Clark, Eldredge & Co.,
and further retailed that there was still due and unpaid
on said judgment] the sum of $886.90. The John Clark
mentioned in the [return was a director and the principal
stockholder of C. ark, Eldredge & Co. Afterwards, on
July 28, an alias Execution issued from the said court in
such action for the full sum of $1673.36, and $30.50
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costs, by virtue of which the marshal levied upon a certain other parcel of the same lot described as beginning
64 1/2 feet west of the N.E. corner of said lot 2, running
thence west 45 1/2 feet, thence south 20 rods, thence east
78 1/2 feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/4
feet, thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet,
thence north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence
north 49 1/2 feet to the place of beginning; and on August 25 the marshal returned that he had sold these premises to the defendants Stephens and Schroeder for the
sum of $828.70, and further certified that the judgment
obtained by said corporation was still unsatisfied to the
extent of $100.
On September 30, said marshal made a further return to the last mentioned writ, in which he certified that
he sold all of lot 12, block 8, five acre plat "A,n Big Field
survey, situate in Salt Lake County, and also a certain
parcel of land described as beginning 39 feet east and 81
feet north of the S.W. corner of said lot 2, running thence
north 209 feet, thence east 16 1/2 feet, thence south 209
feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet to the place of beginning, to
Stephens and Schroeder for the sum of $136, and that,
deducting the costs and expenses of said last levy,
amounting to $30, paid the balance, $106, to the attorneys of Clark, Eldredge & Co., and returned said writ
fully satisfied.
The court found that all that part of lot 2 as described in this statement a plat of which appeared in the
record^-constituted a single-parcel-of land,-and should
have been regarded and treated as such, and not as being
divided into separate lots or parcels, and that the first
parcel sold being 15 1/2 by 28 feet had no ingress or
egress, and that the same as sold would necessarily be
sacrificed on such sale on account of its location, but that
at the time of the sale of this parcel, neither Stephens nor
Schroeder had actual knowledge of any other realty
owned by plaintiff.
The other material facts are stated in the opinion of
the court.
Before the case was called for argument, the suit
was settled so far as the defendants Stephens and his
wife were concerned, leaving Schroeder and his wife
sole defendants. The case coming on to be heard upon
pleadings and proofs, the District Court made a decree
permitting the plaintiff Young to redeem the property
upon paying to the defendants the sum of $723.25, less
certain costs, but subject to one half of a mortgage executed by the defendants, who were ordered to execute
and deliver to plaintiff a deed of the property. From this
decree an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the
Territory, which affirmed the decree of the District
Court, whereupon appellants prayed and were allowed an
appeal to this court.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant attorney challenged a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory
of Utah, which affirmed a decision setting aside execution sales as fraudulent and granting plaintiff debtor
permission to redeem the property7 sold at execution.
OVERVIEW: A default judgment was entered against
the debtor and the creditor's attorneys caused the marshal
to make three separate sales of the debtor's land to them.
The debtor brought suit against the attorneys seeking a
decree setting the sales aside and permitting him to redeem the property. The trial court found that the marshal
and attorney were the only ones present at the execution
sales, that successive sales had produced lower prices,
that one of the attorneys determined that a balance would
be left on the judgment after each sale so that all of the
debtor's land would be sold, and that the debtor had offered to pay the attorneys the full amount of the judgment and additional compensation but the offer was refused. One attorney settled before trial but the remaining
attorney challenged the decree of redemption on the basis that it was entered after the expiration of the statutory
redemption period. The court affirmed because the attorneys' inequitable conduct justified rescission of the execution sales and equity had jurisdiction to grant relief
from-fraudHBOtwkhstanding -the -expiration of the statutory period.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment setting
aside the sales made to the attorney and granting the
debtor permission to redeem the property.
CORE TERMS: redeem, purchaser, redemption, statutory period, bidder, deed, expired, levy, realized, marshal's, inadequacy of price, sale of property, judgment
creditors, irregularity, sacrificed, assurance, ignorant,
forms of law, judgment debtor, statutory time, reconveyance, thereunder, fraudulent, equitable, collector, attended, quantity, insisted, grossly, lulled
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
[HN1] While mere inadequacy of price has rarely been
held sufficient in itself to justify setting aside a judicial
sale of property, courts are not slow to seize upon other
circumstances impeaching the fairness of the transaction,
as a cause for vacating it, especially if the inadequacy be
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so gross as to shock the conscience If the sale has been
attended by any irregularity, as if several lots have been
sold in bulk where they should have been sold separately, or sold in such manner that their full value could
not be realized, if bidders have been kept away, if any
undue advantage has been taken to the prejudice of the
owner of the property, or he has been lulled mto a false
security or, if the sale has been collusivel>, or m any
other manner, conducted for the benefit of the purchaser,
and the property has been sold at a greatly madequate
price, the sale may be set aside, and the owner permitted
to redeem

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
[HN2] If, m addition to madequacy of price there be
other circumstances throwing a shadow upon the fairness
of the transaction, the judgment debtor will be allowed to
redeem

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments >
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Illegal Conduct
[HN3] Although there is no general rule that an attorney
may not purchase at an execution sale, provided it be not
done to the prejudice of his own clients, such purchase m
itself is calculated to throw a doubt upon the fairness of
the sale, and public pohcy and the analogies of law require that such purchases should be considered per se as
m the twilight between legal fraud and fairness, and
should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor,
upon slight additional facts

Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses,
Demurrers & Objections > Affirmative Defenses >
General Overview
Contracts Law > Secured Transactions > Default >
Foreclosure & Repossession > Redemption
[HN4] A purchaser is estopped to insist upon the statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not m
writing and were made without consideration, upon the
ground that the debtor was lulled mto a false security
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
When judicial sales may be canceled for fraud ~
purchase by attorneys ~ suit m equity to annul sale Headnote
1 Execution sales of real property, made for grossly
madequate prices, may be canceled where the property
was purchased by one of the plaintiff s attorneys, and the

sales were made m pursuance of a plan to obtam the
property by successive sales of different parts thereof for
the least possih e sum, leavmg a balance due after each
sale so as to sell all the debtor's property, and the levies
were made unddr specific directions of the attorney, who
was the sole biader at the sales and the only person present except the officer conductmg the sales, especially
where an offer to redeem the property by payment of
more than was due:has been refused
2 One of a {firm of attorneys who has acquired an mterest m the property under a purchase on execution
sales, fraudulently made by his partner, cannot set up the
title thereby acquired and at the same time repudiate his
partner's acts m t[he acquisition thereof
3 The expnjation of the statutory period for redemption from a sale of land under execution does not bar a
suit in equity to [annul the sale and a deed made thereon,
because of the fraudulent conduct of plaintiffs attorneys,
who purchased 4t the sale, where they lulled the debtor
mto false security by assurances of permission to redeem
irrespective of the statute, although these were not m
writing and were| made without consideration
SYLLABUS
While mere inadequacy of price has rarely been held
sufficient m itself to justify setting aside a judicial sale of
property, courts ^re not slow to seize upon other circumstances impeach;Hi:g the fairness of the transaction, as a
cause for vacating
. 6 it, especially if the madequacy be so
gross as to shock the conscience
If the sale:ha|s been attended by any irregularity, as if
several lots hav4 been sold m bulk where they should
have been sold Separately, or sold in such manner that
their full value pould not be realized, if bidders have
been kept away, if any undue advantage has been taken
to the prejudice |)f the owner of the property, or he has
been lulled mto false security, or, if the sale has been
collusively, or u\ any other manner, conducted for the
benefit of the purcha:ser, and the property has been sold
at a greatly inad^quate price the sale may be set aside,
and the owner pe:drmtted to redeem
There are _other facts in this case, stated m the opinion, m addition tp the grossly madequate pnce realized
for the property, that afford ample justification for the
action of the court below m permitting the plaintiff to
redeem upon eqiiitable terms, and ordermg a reconveyanceofthepropeifty
Quoere, whether issue of an alias for the ongmal
amount of the judgment, after the return of a prior execution, satisfied to the amount of nearly one half of such
judgment, the sale of property thereunder to an amount
more than sufficient to satisfy the amount actually due,
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and payment of the excess to plaintiffs attorneys will not
invalidate the entire proceedings'?
Whether the lev} upon the interest of a co-tenant in
a specific part, designated by metes and bounds, of a
certain larger quantity of land is valid, is not decided
Before the time had expired to redeem from the execution sale the plaintiff was told by the defendant that he
would not be pushed, that the statutory tune to redeem
would not be insisted upon and, believing it, acted and
relied upon such assurance Held, that under such circumstances the purchaser was estopped to msist upon the
statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not
m writing and were made without consideration, and that
there was a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity.
founded upon its general right to relieve from the consequences of fraud, accident or mistake, which might be
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for redemption has expired
COUNSEL: Mr A T Schroeder and Mr James B Edmonds for appellants
Mr Parley L Williams for appellee
OPINION BY: BROWN
OPINION
[-331]
[±*513]
[-W*724J. JMEL JUSTICE
BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opmion of
the court
Plaintiff relies mainly for a decree in this case upon
the fact that his mterest m the property in question,
which the trial court found to be worth $ 26,000, was
sacrificed at these several judicial sales to pay a judgment of little more than $ 1700
[HN1] While mere madequacy of price has rarely
been held sufficient [*"338] in itself to justify setting
aside a judicial sale of property, courts are not slow to
seize upon other circumstances impeaching the fairness
of the transaction, as a cause for vacating it, especially if
the madequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience If
the sale has been attended by any irregularity, as if several lots have been sold in bulk where they should have
been sold separately, or sold in such manner that their
full value could not be realized, if bidders have been kept
away, if any undue advantage has been taken to the
prejudice of the owner of the property, or he has been
lulled mto a false security, or, if the sale has been collusively, or in any other manner, conducted for the benefit
of the purchaser, and the property has been sold at a
[**514] greatly madequate price, the sale may be set
aside, and the owner permitted to redeem

Thus, m Byers v Surget 19 How 303, 306, lands to
the amount of 14,000 acres, and estimated at from $
40,000 to $ 70,000 in value, were sold by the sheriff m
satisfaction of a judgment for costs of $ 39, to the attorney for the successful party, and conveyed to him for $
9 31 1/2 The sale was pronounced to have been fraudulent and void and a reconveyance of the property was
decreed It appeared that the owner of the property had
no knowledge of the suit until he was informed of the
sale of the land, that the attorney for the successful party,
the defendant, assumed himself the power to tax the
costs, the right of selecting the final process, of prescribing the description and quantity of the property ^hich he
chose to have seized m satisfaction of directing the sheriff as to the various steps to be taken by him and of becoming the purchaser himself for the petty sum of $ 9 31
1/2 Of this proceeding, Mr Justice Darnel, m delivering the opinion of the court, remarks "Such is the history
of a transaction which the appellant asks of this court to
sanction, and it seems pertinent here to inquire under
what system of civilpolity, under what code of law or
ethics, a transaction like that disclosed by the record m
this case can be excused, or even palliated "
In Graffam v Burgess 117 US 180, 186, two
judgment [^339] creditors became the purchasers for
about $ 150 of unincumbered property worth at least $
10,000, although the judgment debtor had $ 3000 worth
of furniture and personal property m the house subject to
levyJDunng the temporary absence of the complainant,
the defendants entered upon the premises, broke mto the
house and took possession of it on behalf of the purchasers, removed the furniture and other personal property,
including the wearing apparel of the complainant, took
possession of her personal correspondence and papers
and the sum of $ 170 in money, and still retamed possession of the property at the time of the filing of the bill
The court found that the complainant was ignorant of the
issue of the execution or of the sale of the property, that
the purchasers knew that she was unconscious of it, and
endeavoured to keep her so, and took an inequitable
[^^HS]
advantage of her ignorance to get possession
of it In reply to the argument that the proceedmgs were
regular, Mr Justice Bradley observed "It is insisted that
the proceedmgs were all conducted according to the
forms of law Very likely Some of the most atrocious
frauds are committed m that way Indeed, the greater the
fraud intended, the more particular the parties to it often
are to proceed according to the strictest forms of law "
The court commented most severely upon the conduct of
the purchasers, and found no difficulty m setting aside
the sale, although four members of the court dissented
upon the ground that the complamant had failed m her
duty to redeem from the sale withm the time limited by
law
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In Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 118, a farm worth
$ 2000 was sold under a judgment and execution, on
which not more than $ 80 were due, to the attorney of the
plaintiff, who attended the sheriffs sale, for $ 10. The
sale was held upon a stormy day, when no person but the
attorney and the deputy sheriff were present, and it was
held that these facts, connected with the g*oss inadequacy of price, were sufficient to authorize the purchaser
to be held as trustee for the respective interests of the
parties to the execution, and the bidder was allowed to
redeem on equitable terms. A large number of other
cases are also cited by Mr. Justice Bradley in his [*340]
opinion in Graffam v. Burgess, and the general proposition laid down, as above stated, that [HN2] if, in addition
to inadequacy of price there be other circumstances
throwing a shadow upon the fairness of the transaction,
the judgment debtor will be allowed to redeem.
There are other facts in this case than the grossly inadequate price realized for this property, that afford ample justification for the action of the court below in permitting the plaintiff to redeem upon equitable terms, and
ordering a reconveyance of the property.
1. The property was sold to Stephens and Schroeder, who had acted as attorneys for the judgment creditor
throughout the entire transaction, and had been fully paid
by the corporation for their services. In this connection
the trial court further found that Stephens furnished the
officer a description of the property to be levied upon
and sold, and that he accordingly did levy upon and sell
as he was directed by Stephens according to such description. Add to this the further finding that at neither
of the sales was there any other bidder and no other person present than Stephens and the officer conducting the
sales, and we can readily appreciate how inevitable it
was that the property should be sacrificed. [HNS] Although there is no general rule that an attorney may not
purchase at an execution sale, provided it be not done to
the prejudice of his own clients, Pacific Railroad v.
Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 300, such purchase in itself is
calculated to throw a doubt upon the fairness of the sale,
and as is quaintly said of such sales by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Howell v. McCreery, 7 Dana, 388:
"Public policy and the analogies of law require that they
should be considered per se as in the twilight between
legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon slight additional
facts." See also Hall v. Hallet, 1 Cox, 134; Jones v. Martin, 26 Texas, 57; Byers v. Surget, 19 How. 303; Blight's
Heirs v. Tobin, 7 T.B. Mon. 612.
2. The alias execution of July 28 was not only issued for the full amount of the original judgment, $
1673.36 and $30.50 costs, without [**515] deducting $
962.36, realized upon the first execution, [*341] but
under it the marshal sold, under the directions of

Stephens and Sbhroeder, property for an amount in excess of the amount remaining unpaid on the judgment,
and collected the excess and paid it over to Stephens and
Schroeder, who retained it. In this connection the trial
court made the following finding: "At the time of the last
sale, to wit, September 30, 1891, there was a balance due
Clark, Eldredge & Co. of only $ 25.57, and their judgment had been satisfied except said sum, and to satisfy
said balance property was sold as aforesaid, amounting
in all to $ 136, $ 106 of which was paid by the United
States marshal jo said Stephens and Schroeder." Upon
the theory were the judgment creditors entitled to any
more than the amount of their claim, and if, as may
sometimes happen, the property be sold for more than
the amount of the execution, the residue should be returned to the judgment debtor.
There is reason for saying that the issue of an alias
execution for thi original amount of the judgment, after
the return of a prior execution, satisfied to the amount of
nearly one half of such judgment, the sale of property
thereunder to an amount more than sufficient to satisfy
the amount actually due, and the payment of the excess
to the plaintiffs attorneys, invalidate the entire proceedings - the rule in some States being that a levy for an
amount exceeding the amount of the judgment or the
amount actually due upon the judgment with interest and
costs is void. 2 Freeman on Executions, § 381; Glidden
v. Chase, 35 Maine, 90; Pickett v. Breckinridge, 22 Pick.
297; Peck v. Tiffany, 2 N.Y. 451; Hastings v. Johnson, 1
Nevada, 613; Patterson v. Corneal, 3 A. K. Marsh. 618.
But, however this may be, there can be no doubt that this
alias execution and the proceedings thereunder were irregular so far as Stephens and Schroeder were concerned, though perhaps not to the extent of invalidating
the title of a bona fide purchaser. Stead's Executors v.
Course, 4 Cranch, 403; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall
506; Groffv. Joi\es, 6 Wend. 522; Tiernan v. Wilson, 6
Johns. Ch. 411.
The couft below was also of opinion that the
property of the qebtor was sacrificed by the manner in
342] were made, and particularly by
which the sales
the successive sal ^s of his interest in different parts of lot
2, block 70, held in common with his sister, Lydia Y.
Merrill, and that a proper regard for his interests required
that his entire right to the whole land thus held in common should have been sold at one time. This, however,
raises a question |as to which the authorities are not entirely in harmony. viz., whether the levy upon the interest
of a co-tenant in & specific part, designated by metes and
bounds, of a certain larger quantity of land is valid. In
view of the other [***726] manifest irregularities, we
do not feel calledl upon to express an opinion upon this
point.

Page 6
161 U.S. 334, *;16S. Ct. 512,**;
40 L. Ed. 721, ***; 1896 U.S. LEXIS 2167
There is one finding, however, in respect to these
sales, which, taken in connection with the facts that the
defendants were the attorneys for the judgment creditors,
furnished the officer selling the property with the description of the property to be levied upon and sold, and
became the purchasers of the property either directly
-from the marshal, or indirectly through their client Clark,
which is in itself sufficient to justify the action of the
court below in vacating the sales and permitting the
plaintiff to redeem, viz., that "before any of said property
was sold, said Stephens, who was the sole bidder at each
of said sales, formed the intention that, regardless of the
value of the various pieces of property to be sold, and
that were sold, he would leave a balance after each sale,
so that all of the plaintiffs property would be sold, and
he so bid at the various sales as to accomplish, and did
accomplish, said object and purpose." As Stephens was
appellant's partner in the practice of law, and in the
prosecution of the claim of Clark, Eldredge & Co., and
bought the property in for himself and partner, who now
sets up title in himself by virtue of such purchase, it is
clear that he is bound by Stephens' acts and representations. Certainly he cannot set up a title acquired by
Stephens' assistance, and at the same time repudiate his
acts in connection with the acquisition of such title.
There are other circumstances, also, found by the
court below, which, taken in connection with the grossly
inadequate price paid, render it still more inequitable that
purchasers standing in_ the position of tiie defendants in
this case [*343] should insist upon the letter of the bargain, and throw something more than a mere doubt upon
the fairness of the transaction. Before the time had expired for redemption Stephens and Schroeder requested
the collector of taxes of that county to allow them to
bring suit against the plaintiff to recover the taxes owing
by him for the year 1890, on the part of lot 2 described in
the complaint, and agreed that, if the collector so consented, they would bring the suit, and make the collection free of cost to the collector, an arrangement which
was carried out according to its terms. On April 10,
1892, plaintiff offered to pay defendants the full amount
of the judgment obtained by them, together with interest
at the rate of one per cent per month, and also to liberally
compensate them for all their services and trouble, give
them $ 1000 besides as a bonus, and pay all their advances with interest if they would reconvey to him,
which the defendants refused to do. Of a similar offer
and refusal this court in 19 How. 310, 311, speaking
through Mr. Justice Daniel, said: "Another pregnant
proof of the design of the appellant to grasp and retain
what no principle of liberality or equity could warrant, is
the fact, clearly established, of his refusal after the sale to
accept from the appellee, for the redemption of his lands
so glaringly sacrificed, a sum of money considerably
exceeding in amount the judgment for costs, with all the

[**516] expenses incidental to the carrying that judgment into effect. The appellant, by his irregular and unconscientious contrivances, achieved what he conceived
to be an immense speculation, and he determined to avail
himself of it, regardless of its injustice and ruinous consequences to the appellee."
About the same time, the plaintiff, being ignorant of
the fact that lot 12 had been sold and that the defendants
had a deed therefor, informed the defendant Schroeder
that he intended to redeem the lot from a sale that had
been made for the taxes of 1891, and afterwards did so
redeem said lot, and informed Schroeder that it had been
done, the plaintiff being still ignorant that the defendants
held a marshal's deed for it. Again, on April 24, plaintiff
being still ignorant that defendants held a marshal's deed
for lot 12, informed Schroeder [*344] that he intended
to redeem said lot from a tax sale that had been made
thereof for the taxes of 1890, and did subsequently redeem the same, and informed Schroeder of the fact, and
that Schroeder never at any time informed him that he
had obtained a deed for the lot. The court further found
that defendants purposely and intentionally failed to inform the plaintiff that had a title to the said lot at the time
the plaintiff was redeeming the same from the tax sales.
The court further found that the said attorneys, in violation of their duty to obtain the highest possible price for
the property while acting in behalf of their clients, became the bidders upon said property, and so acted as to
obtain^ the same^for the leastjpossible sum^sojis to satisfy the judgment, and at the same time to sell all the
property belonging to said Young. If these facts be not
sufficient to justify a rescission of these sales, it is difficult to imagine what would be so considered.
4. Defendant relies mainly upon the fact that the
statutory period of redemption was allowed to expire
before this bill was filed, but the court below found in
this connection that before the time had expired to redeem the property, the plaintiff was told by the defendant
Stephens that he would not be pushed, that the statutory
time to redeem would not be insisted upon, and that the
plaintiff believed and relied upon such assurance. Under
such circumstances the courts have held with great unanimity that the [HN4] purchaser is estopped to insist
upon the statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances
were not in writing and were made without consideration, upon the ground that the debtor was lulled into a
false security. Guinn v. Locke, 1 Head, 110; Combs v.
Little, 4 NJ. Eq. 310: Griffin v. Coffey, 9 B Mon 452;
Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8; Butt v. Butt, 91 Indiana,
305; Turner v. King, 2 Ired. Eq. 132; Lucas v Nichols,
66 Illinois, 41; McMakin v Schenck, 98 Indiana, 264. In
Southard v. Pope's Ex'rs, 9 B Mon. 261, 264, it is said
that "a refusal by the purchaser to accept the money and
permit the redemption to be made within the time agreed
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would be a fraud upon the defendant in execution, and
authorize an application by him to a court of equity for
relief"
[^345] Probably, if a motion had been made m the
original case to set aside the sale upon the ground of
mere irregularities, such motion would have to be made
before the statutory period for redemption had passed,
but in this class of cases, where fraudulent conduct is
imputed to the parties conductmg the sale, there
[ y ^727] is a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity,
founded upon its general right to relieve from the consequences of fraud, accident or mistake, which may be
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for redemption has expired. It is evident that, where a sale has
culminated m the execution and delivery of a deed to the
purchaser, which is not void upon its face, or a mortgage
has been put upon the property, as m this case, no remedy is complete, which does not go to the cancellation of
such deed, and the complete reinvestment of the title m
the plaintiff It also appears from the findings that appellant has received rents from the property, that various
sums had been expended for taxes and other purposes,
that an accounting was necessary m adjustmg the rights

of the parties, vVhich could not be effectually carried on
m a court of law There can be no doubt of the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such case notwithstanding the
expiration of the statutory time of redemption Graff am
v Burgess, 117\US 180, Blight's Heirs v Tobin, 7TB
Mon 612, Day y Graham, 1 Gilman. (6 111) 435, Morris
v Robey, 73 Illinois, 462, Fergus v Woodworth, 44 Illinois, 374, Bull en v Dawson, 139 Illinois, 633, Jenkins v
Memweather, 109 Illinois, 647, State Bank v Noland,
13 Arkansas, 29y
The appellant's brief deals largely with criticisms
upon the findings and upon the admission of testimony,
which we do not feel it necessary to discuss, as they do
not mvolve the pents of the case, which rest upon the
undisputed facts] It would be a reproach to a court of
equity, if it con d not lay hold of such a transaction as
this is shown to be, and set aside a sale of property acquired under the forms of law and in defiance of natural
justice
The decree cj>f the court below is, therefore,
Affirmed
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1

II contact Mr. Pyper.

2

II

3

||

4

|| ah, contact come about.

5

||

Q.

Do you recall seeing him in person?

6

||

A.

I may have.

7

||

Q.

Okay.

A.

I'm not sure.

Q.

What do you recall during that first communication?

A.

Ah, I don't recall exactly what transpired.

Q.

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY) :
THE WITNESS:

Correct.

Correct

I -- I don't recall exactly how that,

I think

he expressed his frustration and wanted information on how to
redeem the property prior to the expiration of the redemption
period.
Q.

And how did you respond?

A.

I told him that he needed to contact the plaintiff's

attorney in the action and get a payoff or find out what he
needed to do to redeem it.
Q.

How did he specifically express frustration to you?
THE COURT:

You're asking him to repeat what Mr.

Pyper said; right?

j

MR. QUESENBERRY:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
Q.

Correct, Your Honor.

Can you do that?
I can't pervade and I -- I --

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY):

Did you recall any emotions or

any other indications, ah, giving you this idea of
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
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1

frustration?
THE WITNESS:

2
3

redeemed, you know.

4

I don't recall.

5
6
7

Q.

Well, he -- hie was anxious to get it

And I -- I -- bejyond that, I don't know.

Do you have any other recollection, ah, in any of

the three communications that you had with Mr. Pyper?
A.

Well, I remember a phone call conversation, and it

8

was -- the phone call was made from I' believe it was D-Land

9

Title and it -- it was shortly before the redemption period

10

expired.

Only days.

And -- and he, 'ah, expressed concern

11

that they were unable to get a payoff so that they could

12

redeem the property.

13

Q.

14

D-Land Title?

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

-- and he?

17

A.

- ah, Mr. Pyper was at D-Land Title.

18

Q.

Okay.

Or was it just you -As I recall, --

Do you remember anything else of that conversation,

19
20

Do you remember, was that a conference call from

that phone conversation from D-Land?

21

A.

I don't recall.

22

Q.

But you -- you do recall thfrt being prior to the ex-

23

-- ah, expiration of did you say the ^redemption period?

24

A.

Redemption period.

Yes, it was.

25

Q.

Do you have any other recollections of the three
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRiPT
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verruled and Exhibit No. 3 is received.

1

cb]ection's

2

an aDpraisal

That's

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3
was received into evidence.)

3
4

FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION
5
BY MR. QUESENBERRY:
6
Q.

Mr. Pyper, ah, would you turn to the second page.

7
THE COURT:

Well, it says what it says.

I don't

8
need a witness to read it to me.
9
Q.

(EY MR. QUESENBERRY):

Okay.

10
Mr. Pyper, is the property -- ah, was it encumbered
11
with anything during that 6-month, ah, redemption period?
12

inrj

/v ± i i\i IL o o :

let! .

13

Q.

What was it encumbered with?

14

A.

Ah, Justin Bond had a couple of liens on it.

there wa-S four or five different -- different liens.

15
16
17

Q.

1

18
19

Ah,

1

'

Yes.

Q.

His judgment, which is at issue here today?

A

Everything, except for, ah, Justin Bond.

A.

Correct.

Q-

Nowf

| against
A.

zZ

Were you able to clear title?

C-le

chere was talk about a, ah - - a large bank lien

property.

Do you know what that was about?

That was part of the original mortgage when I built

the nous e back in '96, and it was paid down to 3 0 -- about
?d

1
|J

C "} O
P ^ P
J j O , !J '\J U .

Q.

Then we, ah, settled with the bank.
Has that deed been reconveyed off of title?
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A.

Yes.

2

MR. QUESENBERRY:

3

THE COURT:

4

Q.

5

(Indicated)?

6
7

Go ahead.

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY) :

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Your Honoij:, if I may approach.

Do yoiji recognize that document

Yes.

And what is it?

8

THE COURT:

Does it have an exhibit number on it?

9

MR. QUESENBERRY:

I believe -- No. 4, Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

THE WITNESS:

12

THE COURT:

13

And the question was do you recognize?

14

THE WITNESS:

15

Q.

16
17

I'm asking the jvitness.
Exhibit -- ye$.
Thank you.

Yes.

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY) :
THE WITNESS:

And w)iat is it

Ah, the deed bf reconveyance from

Wells Fargo Bank.

18

Q.

That you received from Well|s —

19

A.

Yes.

20

21

No. 4.

MR.

QUESENBERRY:

Wells Fargo?

Y o u r Hono|r, I'd

move

this

exhibit be admitted as evidence.

22

THE COURT:

23

Have you seen the exhibit, iMz. Reyes?

24

MZ. REYES:

25

that

Mz. Reyes?

(No| verbal response.)

Your Honor, if I could just voir dire

Mr. Pyper on this issue quickly.
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THE COURT:

Oh.

MZ. REYES:

I'm not asking him to disclose.

I'm

just asking him if anyone assisted him in it.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

THE WITNESS:
Q.

Ah, yes.

(BY MZ. REYES):
THE WITNESS:

Q.

Go ahead and answer.

And who was that?
Ah, my attorney Bryan Quesenberry.

That's the same person that's here with you today;

is that true?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.
And -- and when was this deed of reconveyance

executed?
You mean when did I -•
What is it dated?

Q.

Well, when is it signed?

A.

Ah, this is dated the 23rd day of April, 2007.

Q.

So on - - on November 9th during --- at the time of

the she riff ' s sale the, ah trust deted would have still b<sen
against the p roperty at that time; correct?

A.

Yes
MZ. REYES:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Back to you, Mr. Quesenberry.

You re

j

still - - you':re offer ing Nc). 4?

MR. QUESENBERRY:
right.

Ah, yes , and I - - ah, that's

She wanted to voir dire.

And yes, I 'm still offering j
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1

in .

2

THE COURT:

What about No. 4?

3

MZ. REYES:

It's fine.

4

THE COURT:

Received.

5

(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4
was received into evidence].)

Should I receive it?

6
Next question, Mr. Ouesenberry.
FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. QUESENBERRY:
9
10
11

Q.

What did you plan to do abbut the property after the

sheriff's sale, November of '06?
A.

Ah, to fix it up so it was that we could get the

12
appraisal for the bank.

We started tight away qualifying for

13
the bank loan and, ah, then to -14
THE COURT:

I think I'm getting more than I wanted

15

here . The question's "What were you gonna do?"

16

"I was gonna fix it up."

17

Q.

So let's g6 on to the next question.

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY):

Okay,

18

Did you apply for a bank lcpan?

19

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

20

Q.

And with what bank?

21

A.

I can't recall the name of the bank.

22
23

Do yoiji recall?
Ah, it was

done tttrough, ah, Mike and Chris right here in -- in Ephraim.
Q.

That's fine.

That -- that 1s not important.

Did you do that within, ah, 180 days after?

24
25

And he said,

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Were you able to, ah - - to redeem the property from

the sheriff's sale within that 180 days.
A.

No.

Q.

Why not?

A.

I could not get a payoff that the bank requested,

ah, from Dorius/Bond.
Q.

Okay.
What efforts did you make to obtain that payoff

amount?
A.

I made several phone calls.

0.

Now, are you looking at an exhibit?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I believe we already admitted Exhibit No. 1, which

is a copy of your notes.

Do you have that in front of you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And do you have the original, as well, in front of

A.

Yes.

you?

MR. QUESENBERRY:

Your Honor, I would like to walk

through this with him -THE COURT:

Ask your questions.

See if there's an

objection.
MR. QUESENBERRY:

- - i f the Court is, ah, would

indulge me.
MZ. REYES:

Your Honor, I would object that I think
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-

1

his hand

2

"

(Inaudible).

•

i

Okay.

Ah, Your Honor, you would h|ave -- prefer that he

3

look at the one with the, ah, the exhlibit tag on it --

4

(Inaudible) -- courtesy copy?

5

THE COURT;

6

No.

MR. QUESENBERRY:

8

THE COURT:

10
11

required to do.

Okay.

I think that's khat a witness is

I think he probably lought to turn the paper

over and see what his recollection is|.

Q.

12
13

I'd prefer that he give his

recollection about what happened.

7

9

1

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY):

Okay.

Flip it over.

Do you recall when you first began making phone
calls to Mr. Dorius's office.

14

A.

Yes .

15

Q.

About when was that?

16

A.

Ah, April 20th, after I received a phone call from

17

you, stat ing the bank had reconveyed

18

0.

Oh.

19

A.

Okay.

20

Q.

I don't want to hear my conversation with you.

21

Okav.

Don't --

Did you take notes of these phone calls?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

That series of phone calls.

24
25

Did you -- how did you take them?

How did you

specifically take these notes?
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A.

Ah, each and every time I called them I had a tablet

with me and I wrote the time, the date, and basically what was
discussed.
Q.

Within how -- (Inaudible) -- the period of time from

when you hung up the phone to when you wrote these down?
6
7
8
9

A.

Within a minute, two minutes.

Sometimes right as

soon as I hung up.
Q.

So you began on - - on Friday the 20th.

Dorius or Mr. Bond?

Was that Mr.

Do you recall who you called?

10

A.

I was trying to reach Mr. Dorius.

11

Q.

And were you successful reaching him, initially?

12

A.

On the first call, no.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

On the second call, what was

on the 25th of April, ah, I spoke with Mr. Dorius.
Q.

Did you speak with him any other time, other than

that April the 25th phone call?
A.

I think we spoke one more time, but it was way

further down the line.
Q.

So the April 25th phone call you spoke with him.

What do you recall by the conversation with him?
A.

Ah, I called him and told him that I needed the, ah,

21

payoff for the judgment and liens that were on the property

22

because I had the bank loan in place and I also

23

source of money to pay him and, ah - -

had another

24

Q.

How did -- how did he respond to that?

25

A.

He asked me, as I recall, something, "What do you
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1

II think would be fair on this?"

And t offered - - I said, "Fair

2

H to me, would be about 58,500.

But } need the full payoff on

your letterhead, signed by you, and sent to D-Land Title so
that this bank loan can be closed."
Everything was ready to gc( except for the -- for Mr.
6

II Dorius or Mr. Bond.

7

||

9
10

0.

And how did he respond to that?

A.

Ah, said that he would get into the file and he

H would get back to me later; that he Ihad to speak with, ah, Mr.
II Bond and then he would get back to m|e.

11

Q.

When did you call his offife next?

12

A.

Ah, it started on the, ah, 25th and I called every

13

day, except the weekends.

Do you recall?

So the 23£d, probably the 24th.

14

Q.

Well, so far you've talked about the 20th --

15

A.

20th.

Q.

-- and then the 25th --

17

A.

25th.

18

Q.

—

16

19
20

J

when you actually had tl}e conversation with him.

So after the 25th?
A.

1 called him on the 25th be|cause I got the

21

reconveyance from the bank in my hand|.

22

cleared, so that's the - - when I spokie with him.

23
24
25

Q.

So then I -- that was

About how many times do you recall calling his

office, after this -- this initial phpne call with him?
A.

Over 28 times.

And I called their number in, ah,
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maybe it's a different -MR. QUESENBERRY:
THE COURT:

The conversation with him.

You're asking him for a date.

MR. QUESENBERRY:

Correct.

If he recalls when he

first spoke with Mr. Bond.
THE WITNESS:

Ah, looks like the, ah, 10th of May.

Q.

(BY MR. QUESENBERRY):

And what did you tell Mr.

A.

Ah, the discussion I had with, ah, Mr. Dorius, ah,

Bond?

that I needed the payoff; that I had the bank loan plus I had
other sources of money to pay them off.

And I also asked him

who was in charge -- who I need to get this from who was in
charge of this lien.
It was in his name, but Mr. Dorius owned it or
something because he worked for him.

And Mr. Bond told me

that Mr. Dorius was in charge of the --of the loan so.
Q.

Did he indicate what a payoff amount would be?

A.

No.

Q.

How did you end the conversation with him?

A.

Just that they would get together, Mr. Dorius and

Mr. Bond , and figure out the payoff , and they would get back
to me.
Q.

Mr. Bond said he' d call me back.
Did Mr. Bond tell you, in that conversation, he

would ca 11 you back?
A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

And during that time span and those phone calls to

2

her, did she ever tell you, ah, that Mr. Dorius doesn't want

3

to talk to you.

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Did she ever tell you that they would not get you a

6

payoff amount?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Did she ever tell you to stop calling?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Did Mr. Bond, at any time, tell you, "Stop calling

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Did he, at any time, tell you, "I'm not giving you a

11

14

me. "

payoff amount."

15

A.

No.

16

Q.

"Leave me alone."

17

A.

No.

18

Q.

How about Mr. Dorius?

19

Did he, at.any time, tell

you, "Leave me alone --" --

20

A.

No.

21

Q.

-- or "Stop calling," or "^'m not gonna get you

22

anything."

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

Now I think you testified 4 ^ o u t your conversations

25

with Mr. Dorius.

You've mentioned one, early on, April 20th.
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1

Was there another conversation that you had with Mr. Dorius?

2

A.

Yes.

I believe we had a second one, ah, two to

3

three days after the first one.

4

trouble getting a hold of Mr. Bond and that he would do so and

5

then get back with me.

6

Q.

i

10

Did he say what he'd get back with you about or what

information he'd get you?

8
9

And he * said he was having

j

A.

With the payoff that I'd been asking for.

Q.

Did he give you any indication that he would not

provide you the information you've requested?

11

A.

No.

12

0.

How about after that?

13

A.

That --

14

Q.

Did he call you - - o r you talked with him at any

15
16
17
18

| time after that second conversation?
A.

Just the two times that I recollect.

The rest of

'em is just trying to get a hold of him.
Q.

Did you expect, during this time of questions

19

MZ. REYES:

I'm gonna object as to leading.

20

THE COURT:

Well, what he expected doesn't make any

21
22

difference either, so sustained.
0.

(BY MR. GUESENBERRY):

Go on to another question.
Did you ever get a -- get a

23

payoff amount from either Mr. Bond or Mr. Dorius or someone

24

from their office?

25

THE WITNESS:

No.
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1

It's still a good argument.

I don't mean to say

2

your argument's not worthwhile, but, a(h, it doesn't change my

3

mind about receiving the document.

4

I

Okay.

Other questions?

5

MR. QUESENBERRY:

6

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

Cross examination, Mz. Reyes.

7

CROSS EXAMINATION

8

BY MZ. REYES:

9

Q.

Mr. Pyper, you indicate that|, ah, you had a bank

10

loan in place.

That -- that was your testimony; correct?

11

That you had a bank loan in place.

12

A.

My son.

13

Q.

Okay.

14

So you've never had a bank lloan in place.

15

never had funds available or any proof}.

16

me just ask you this.

17

T

- Pyper.

Okay.

You've

Well, then let

This appraisal, this was done for Ryan

Who is Ryan T. Pyper?

18

A.

My son.

19

Q.

You testified earlier that |ou had a bank loan in

20

place.

You just needed a payoff.

Th4t's not true; right?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

He had the bank loan.

23

A.

I did all the paperwork and got everything for him

24

and set it up.

25

house.

He had the bank loan iijL place.
Okayi

But it was in his nam^.

He was buying the
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1

II met.

You called him E O make an offer of settlement.

2

II

3

|| discussion he, ah, asked me what I thought was fair and I says

A.

No.

I called him to get the payoff.

During this

$85 -- $8,500 would be more than fair to me, ah, for what was
done.

Then he said something like, "Well, you've really

ruffled --" -Q.

Okay.

need to respond.

You don't -- you don't need to -- you don't
I just need you to answer my questions,

please.
So isn't it true that you also indicated to Mr.
Dorius that you would have to have the lien released off of
the home in order for you to come up with the $8,500 that you
were offering at that time?
A.

For the bank loan, ah, yes.

I needed a written

statement from him for the payment -- total payment, releasing
everything, before the bank would give money.

But I had

another source of money, ah, cash.
Q.

So at that time you didn't actually have --at that

time you didn't actually have the ability to pay $8,500 unless
they were willing to release the lien; isn't that true?
A.

At that time I had the ability to pay the full

amount, whatever that may have been.
Q.

Why did you make no effort to attempt to tender

into -- I'm sorry -- to provide that money to Mr. Dorius'
office?

I
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1

A.

No one would ever cell me what I owed.

2

Q.

But you knew what you owed,

You indicated that

3

under the Writ of Execution you knew you owed him

4

approximately -- your testimony was Approximately 13,000, but

5

you made no efforts whatsoever to provide any moneys; isn't

6

that true?

7

A.

No.

Not until they would cjjive me, ah the payoff

8

with interest or whatever else was gc^nna be added on there so

9

that the title would be clear.

10
11
12
13

Whatever they would have told

me, I had the money at that time to jj)ay them off.
Q.

Subject to them releasing tthe lien on the property.

That's the only way you could get thg money.
A.

No.

I had the cash to pay them the full amount of

14

whatever they may have come up with t}p to $18,000.

15

the cash at that time to pay them, --

16

Q

17

A,

18

Ah, I had

Any
but I needed the note frlom them to get my loan

from the bank afterwards --

19

Q.

At this time you knew that --

20

A.

-- to release it.

21

Q.

- - your time to redeem the p r o p e r t y was running;

22

correct?

23

A.

Yes.

24

0.

You knew about the sherifff£ sale that took place on

25

November 9th.
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Q.

(BY MZ. REYES):

Since the time of the sheriff's sale

on November 9th of 2 00S, has someone been living in the home?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

Q.

And who was that person?

A.

My son.

Q.

And is -- is he paying to reside in the home?

A.

He's done payment by, ah, we've put a new roof on,

all new soffit and facial, redone bathrooms, ah, poured
cement.
Q.

When were all these things done?

A.

Ah, from November -- well, over the last year and,

ah, before the appraisal.
Q.

So this appraisal takes into account improvements on

the property -A.

Yes.

Q.

-- that weren't there at the time of the sheriff's

sale in November of

'06.

A.

Right.

Q.

Okay.

A.

The appraiser came out and told us before he could

,

appraise it that he needed certain things done for the bank
for him to appraise this property.
Q.

So we done them things.

Was -- was the home, at that time when you said this

appraiser contacted you, was that some time before November or
in November?

(No verbal response.)
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